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Forthcoming:  111 Colum. L. Rev. (2011)  
 
 RETHINKING THE LAWS OF GOOD FAITH PURCHASE 
 
Alan Schwartz* and Robert E. Scott** 
 
 This article is a comparative economic analysis of the disparate doctrines governing the 
good faith purchase of stolen or misappropriated goods.  Good faith purchase questions have 
occupied the courts and commentators of many nations for millennia.  We argue that prior 
treatments have misconceived the economic problem.  An owner of goods will take optimal 
precautions to prevent theft if she is faced with the loss of her goods; and a purchaser will make an 
optimal investigation into his seller’s title if the purchaser is faced with the loss of the goods.  An 
owner and a buyer cannot both be faced with the full loss, however.  The good faith purchase 
question thus presents a problem of “double marginalization,” and as with these problems 
generally, it cannot be solved in a first best efficient way.  However, the laws of the major 
commercial nations are less efficient than they could be.  This is particularly true of current U.S. 
law: In the U.S., an owner always can recover stolen goods, which reduces her incentive to take 
optimal precautions but creates first best incentives to search for stolen goods.  In turn, a buyer of 
those goods makes a suboptimal investigation into title because the owner may never find him.  We 
propose that the owner should be permitted to recover goods only if she satisfies a negligence 
standard set at the socially optimal precaution level (which we argue is feasible).  This would 
increase her incentive to take precautions while retaining her efficient incentive to search.  Since 
owner search and buyer investigation are complements, our proposal leaves unchanged the buyer’s 
(suboptimal) incentive to investigate.  Also under current law, an owner who voluntarily parts with 
her goods cannot recover them from a good faith purchaser.  This rule reduces the owner’s 
incentive to search and so reduces the buyer’s incentive to investigate. Thus, we propose that a 
negligence standard should apply to owners generally. We argue that the verifiability objections to a 
vague standard of negligence can be satisfied by the specification of rule-like proxies for owner 
negligence.  A comparative analysis of the law of good faith purchase in the leading commercial 
jurisdictions shows the chaotic nature of the current disparity in treatment of owners and buyers.  
Since today many stolen goods cross national borders, a generally applicable solution to the good 
faith purchase issue will further reduce the demand for stolen goods, reduce the incidence of 
strategic litigation and enhance social welfare. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
                                                 
*Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor, Yale School of Management. 
** Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for Contract and Economic Organization, Columbia 
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  In 1945, at the conclusion of the Second World War, a valuable painting by Claude Monet 
was stolen from its owner in Germany.  By 1956 the painting had appeared on the international art 
market and was acquired by a highly respected art dealer in New York.  The dealer sold the painting 
in 1957 to a good faith purchaser for value.  The purchaser held the painting for over 30 years 
without facing a claim from the original owner, although her identity was readily accessible through 
the Monet Catalogue Raisonne, a copy of which was available a few miles from the original owner’s 
residence.  The original owner discovered the location and identity of the purchaser in 1981 and 
sued in replevin to recover the painting.1  In De Weerth v. Baldinger, the Second Circuit found for 
the good faith purchaser despite the “well-settled” American rule that neither a thief nor a good faith 
purchaser from a thief can pass good title to stolen goods.2  The court held that New York would 
impose a duty of reasonable diligence on the owner to learn the identity of the ultimate purchaser.3  
Several years later, the Guggenheim Museum in New York brought an action in replevin to recover 
a stolen painting by Marc Chagall that had been sold to a good faith purchaser by a reputable dealer 
in 1967.4  From the time of the theft until the Museum fortuitously discovered the painting’s location 
twenty years later, the Museum had taken no steps to publicize the theft, nor did it inform other 
                                                 
1 The plaintiff sued within the three year New York statute of limitations that runs from the time a demand is made for 
the good’s return that the purchaser refuses. The facts are reported in De Weerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). 
2 836 F.2d at 107-08.  The “theft” rule is an application of the fundamental common law principle of nemo dat quod non 
habet -- one cannot convey greater rights in property than one has.  It applies to sales transactions through UCC §1-103.  
The rights of good faith purchasers when the goods have been voluntarily transferred to a miscreant are embodied in 
UCC §2-403(1) & (2). For discussion, see ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 491-526 (1991), and CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, ROBERT E. SCOTT & ALAN SCHWARTZ, PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS AND CREDIT INSTRUMENTS 44-5 (2007). 
3 Id. at 110. 
 
4 The trial court granted summary judgment for the purchaser, following the DeWeerth precedent.  The Appellate 
Division reversed, on the ground that under New York’s demand and refusal rule no due diligence was imposed on the 
owner to search for stolen goods.  Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S. 2d 618, 621-2 (App. Div. 
1990), aff’d 569 N.E. 2d, 426 (N.Y. 1991).  The New York court did recognize the potential right of the buyer to use the 
lack of due diligence by the owner to support a laches defense.  Laches would lie, however, only if “it was clear that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in initiating an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by the delay.”  Robins Island 
Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp. 959 F.2d 409, 423 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 
 4
museums, galleries, or any law enforcement authorities.5  In Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. 
Lubbell, the New York Court of Appeals found for the Museum as original owner, holding, contrary 
to DeWerth, that New York’s statute of limitations does not require the victim to search diligently 
for stolen property.6 
 
  The results in DeWeerth and Guggenheim illustrate the inconsistency in the treatment of 
original owners and good faith buyers in the law of good faith purchase.  This disparity in treatment 
is even more evident when comparing results between jurisdictions that apply a “theft” rule, under 
which an owner who sues in a timely manner always recovers stolen goods,7 and those that apply the 
doctrine of Market Overt.   Under Market Overt, good faith purchasers from a merchant dealer 
prevail over owners of stolen goods notwithstanding an owner’s diligent efforts to prevent the theft 
and to recover the goods once the theft has occurred.8  This disparity in the legal treatment of stolen 
and misappropriated goods impedes international efforts to solve a significant economic problem: 
The annual national and international trade in stolen and misappropriated goods is in the billions of 
dollars.9   
 
 There are several reasons why good faith purchase law is a troubled legal area.  Initially, 
scholars have not reached consensus on a solution to the good faith purchase problem; that is, they 
                                                 
5 For an excellent discussion of the case, see Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B. Goldstein, A Tale of 
Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of 
Stolen Art, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 49 (1995). 
6 569 N.E. 2d at 428-29. 
7  The owner’s right to recover stolen goods in jurisdictions, such as the United States, that follow the theft rule is 
contingent on the owner bringing suit within the statute of limitations for an action in replevin.  See text accompanying 
notes 17 -20 infra, for discussion of the wide variety in limitation periods. 
  
8 See note 16 infra. 
9 Art theft is the third most profitable world-wide crime behind drug smuggling and illegal arms trading; the profits run 
to an estimated $2 billion annually.  David Holmstrom, Stolen-Art Market is a Big Business at $2 Billion a Year, The 
Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 11, 1994 at 1.  The commercial law of good faith purchase is the principal private law 
supplement to the criminal law in deterring theft.   
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have not agreed on just when the owners of stolen or misappropriated goods should recover them, 
and when not.10  The literature has identified many of the considerations that should influence a 
solution, but has yet to aggregate these considerations into a coherent policy response.  In addition,  
the fragmentation among scholars  mirrors a similar fragmentation among law makers.  Good faith 
purchase rules have been around for a long time – they appear in the Code of Hammurabi -- and the 
rules are part of every advanced state’s commercial law, but to this day the laws themselves differ 
widely.11 
 
 Uniformity across legal systems does exist, but only at the level of first principles.  Common 
law and civil code systems begin with the fundamental principle that, ordinarily, one cannot convey 
greater rights than one has (a principle embodied in the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet).12  
The variation across legal systems arises from the significant differences in the exceptions countries 
create to the nemo dat principle.  Under the law of good faith purchase as it is embodied in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the nemo dat rule is subject to only two exceptions.  First, under 
the “voidable title” rule, if the original owner is induced (say, by fraud or deceit) to transfer goods 
under a transaction of purchase, the transferee acquires the power to transfer a good title to a good 
faith purchaser for value.13  Second, under the “entrustment” rule, if the original owner entrusts 
                                                 
10 Compare Barak Medina, Augmenting the Value of Ownership by Protecting It Only Partially: The “Market Overt” 
Rule Revisited, 19 J. L. Econ. & Org. 343 (2003) (arguing for the relative efficiency of the “Market Overt” rule 
protecting rights of good faith purchasers of stolen goods), with Harold R. Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics and the 
Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. Legal Stud. 569 (1980) (arguing for the efficiency of the American “theft rule” protecting 
rights of original owners of stolen goods in contests with good faith purchasers), and with Menachem Mautner, The 
Eternal Triangles of the Law: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties,90 Mich. L. Rev. 95 
(1991) (criticizing the American “theft rule” on efficiency grounds), and with ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, 
SALES LAW AND THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 508-12 (1991) (same). 
11 If one were to focus solely on that portion of good faith purchase law that is embodied in the Uniform Commercial 
Code §2-403, it would be tempting to conclude that the issues were now well settled; there are relatively few cases under 
this section of the Code and none of the reported cases challenge the accepted wisdom that the original owner’s rights 
are superior to the ultimate purchaser, except in two narrowly prescribed circumstances. Such a conclusion would be in 
error, however.  In fact, the legal rules governing good faith purchase vary widely across jurisdictions, and scholars have 
not agreed on a normatively defensible solution. We review the laws of leading jurisdictions in Part V infra. 
12 See Appendix, infra. 
 
13 UCC §2-403(1) provides 
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.  When goods 
have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the 
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goods to a merchant who deals in goods of the kind, the merchant has the power to transfer the 
owner’s title to a buyer in the ordinary course of business (BOC).14  But, as noted above, in many 
other legal systems an innocent buyer can acquire rights in yet a third context – where stolen goods 
are transferred to a merchant dealer who, in turn, sells the goods to a bona fide purchaser for value.15   
Here, if the good faith buyer relies on the Market Overt, he prevails against the original owner.16     
 Much of the action in good faith purchase contests, as measured by the volume of litigation, 
turns on statute of limitations questions.  Here again there is great diversity, both among United 
                                                                                                                                                                   
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check 
which is later dishonored, or ( c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a “cash sale,” or (d) the delivery 
was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. 
14 UCC §2-403(2) provides 
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him the power to 
transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.  
 
    UCC §1-201(9) defines “buyer in ordinary course of business” as  
a person that buys in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the right of another person in the 
goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of 
that kind.... 
 
15 Jurisdictions that have some version of the Market Overt rule include Israel (Sale of Goods (1968) §34), Italy (Civil 
Code Art.1161), France (Civil Code §2277), Germany (BGB §935), Quebec (Civil Code Art. 953), Spain (Civil Code 
Art. 464), Brazil (Civil Code Art.1219), Mexico (Civil Code Art. 799), China, Property Law of the People’s Republic of 
China Art. 107), and Japan (Civil Code Art. 194).  See sources cited in Appendix, infra.  The rule traces its lineage to the 
Code of Hammurabi, the Ordinances of Manu (India), early Saxon law, and early Hebraic laws. Daniel E. Murray, Sale 
in Market Overt, 9 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 24 (1960). 
16 In order to qualify as a Market Overt, the merchant dealer must display the goods openly for sale.  In the true Market 
Overt, the good faith buyer who purchases in a qualifying market gets good title to the purchased goods. See e.g., Israel 
(Sale of Goods (1968) §34), Italy (Civil Code Art. 1161), Germany (BGB §935), and England until 1994 (Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 §22). In many civil law jurisdictions, as well as in regimes ranging from early India to Japan, the original 
owner is entitled to the return of his goods but only if he pays the buyer the purchase price the buyer paid to acquire 
them.  See, e.g., French Civil Code §2277; Spanish Civil Code Art. 464; Mexico Civil Code Art. 799; Property Laws of 
the People’s Republic of China Art. 107; Japan Civil Code Art. 194.  A number of jurisdictions –Canada, India, England 
today and Russia—reject the Market Overt rule and follow the American rule allowing the original owner to recover 
stolen goods from the good faith purchaser.  For citations, see Appendix infra.   The American rejection of the Market 
Overt rule evolved as an artifact of the revolutionary period and path dependence largely explains why it remains to this 
day.  Early U.S. courts declined to import the English rule of Market Overt in the period just after the Constitution was 
ratified because, as Chancellor Kent stated in an early New York case, “there are no such open markets in the United 
States.” Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns 471 (N.Y. 1806).  The common law rule in England permitted the good faith 
buyer to prevail over the original owner if he bought in any “open” market (that is, a market where the goods were 
openly displayed to customers) in the City of London or in any of the “county fairs” that were regularly held.  Peter M. 
Smith, Valediction to Market Overt, 41 Am. J. Legal Hist. 225 (1997).  The English rule continued unchanged for 
several hundred years until repealed by statute in 1994.  The repeal was not prompted by a principled preference for 
vindicating the original owner’s rights, but because the British courts apparently encountered line drawing problems.  Id. 
at —. 
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States jurisdictions as well as internationally. There are currently three general rules used to 
determine when the statute of limitations begins to run.  At the polar extreme in protecting the 
original owner’s rights is the “demand and refusal” rule, under which the statute of limitations in 
replevin begins to run only when the owner finds his goods, demands their return, and the buyer 
refuses him.17  At the other extreme are limitation periods that run either from the time of the theft18 
or the time of purchase by the merchant seller so long as the buyer can establish an open, notorious 
and continuous adverse possession.19  Finally, a number of jurisdictions have adopted an 
intermediate “discovery” rule under which the statute of limitations begins to run when the original 
owner discovers or should have discovered the location of her stolen goods.20 
 
 The lack of harmony in good faith purchase laws, combined with the multi-billion dollar 
market in stolen goods, creates costly and unnecessary domestic and international litigation.  Over 
the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in contests between original owners and 
                                                 
17 Under New York law, the statute of limitations in replevin is three years. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. R. §214(3) (McKinney 
1990).  The “demand and refusal” rule by which the statute of limitations is not triggered until a demand is made and 
return refused was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874); see also Menzel 
v. List, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, (Sup. Ct. 1966),modified, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev’d 246 N.E. 2d 742 (N.Y. 
1969). The rule has been justified on the grounds that it protects the purchaser who, as a result of the rule, is not liable in 
conversion until a demand is made. Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership is No Pretty Picture, 43 Duke L. J. 337 
(1993).  At least one foreign jurisdiction has adopted a similar statute of limitations.  See Czech Civil Code §§102, 134 
(stipulating that owner can assert property right against good faith purchaser for three years from when said right was 
asserted to the good faith purchaser). 
 
18 See e.g., French Civil Code Art. 2276; Swiss Civil Code §§722, 728, 729; Japan Civil Code Art.193. 
19 See e.g., Reynolds v. Bagwell, 198 P.2d 215, 216 (1948) (“the statute of limitations as to personal property, though 
stolen, when held in good faith for value, open and notoriously, runs in favor of such adverse possession so as to bar a 
recovery by the true owner after the expiration of [the statutory period]; and San Francisco Credit Clearing House v. 
Wells, 239 P. 319, 321 (Cal. 1925) (finding that possession lacked continuity and openness, thereby precluding 
operation of adverse possession).  The “adverse possession” rule suffers from a verifiability problem: proving open and 
notorious possession of personal property is more problematic than it is in the case of real property.  See text 
accompanying notes 97-99 infra. 
20 See e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A. 2d 862 (N.J. 1980), and Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F. 2d (278) 7th Cir. 1990), cert 
denied, 112 S.Ct. 377 (1992).  See also Property Law of the People’s Republic of China Art. 107; Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation Arts. 196, 200, and 234. 
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good faith purchasers.21  The cases raise complex conflict of laws issues.  In many of the cases, the 
resolution of the contest turns on the question of which jurisdiction’s law determines the parties’ 
rights.  Thus, when the location of the goods and/or the domicile of the claimants are in different 
states or nations, the multi-jurisdictional character of the dispute substantially complicates the 
ownership issues.  The choice of law determination may support the policy choices of a particular 
jurisdiction, but from a social welfare perspective, much of the litigation is socially wasteful and the 
law, as described by some commentators, is “chaotic.”22 
  
 In this Article, we develop a novel treatment of the good faith purchase problem.  This 
treatment has three purposes: to explain why the problem has been so hard to solve; to propose a 
solution that responds to the real difficulties that courts face in deciding these contests; and to show 
how various countries’ laws can be harmonized to increase efficiency and reduce transaction costs.   
 
 To see why the problem is so intractable, recall first that there are at least four parties to any 
good faith purchase dispute: the original owner, the thief,23 the ultimate purchaser and the seller to 
the ultimate purchaser, who is often a merchant.  We focus here on the original owner (O) and the 
ultimate purchaser (B) for two reasons.  First, the thief commonly is judgment proof, and so will not 
respond to the monetary sanctions that commercial law creates.  Second, the merchant is effectively 
a buyer.  If the original owner prevails against the ultimate purchaser, the purchaser sues his seller 
on a title warranty;24 and if the original owner loses to the ultimate purchaser, the owner can sue the 
                                                 
21 See infra notes 80, 88, 109 and 114. 
 
22 For an excellent discussion of the “chaos” that results from the interaction of disparate good faith purchase laws and 
neutral choice of law rules, see Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigations Between 
Original Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 Duke L. J. 955 (2001). 
23 A “thief” is either the person who actually steals goods, or is a voluntary transferee who wrongfully misappropriates 
the goods and sells them to a third party.  As an example of this latter case, the transferee/thief acquires the goods in 
return for a check or a promise to subsequently pay cash.  Subsequently, the check is dishonored or the cash is not paid 
and the thief sells the goods to a third party.   
  
24 See UCC §2-312.  If sellers in the relevant trade disclaim this warranty, the demand curve will reflect the risk that 
buyers bear, so a seller cannot entirely escape the consequences of selling untitled goods. 
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seller in conversion.25  As a consequence, the seller to the ultimate purchaser is a buyer, in the sense 
that he must lose the goods’ value to someone if he purchased a bad title.26  Little generality is lost, 
therefore, by restricting the analysis to the behavior of the original owner and the ultimate purchaser. 
  
 Even so, there is no agreement regarding which legally induced incentives are appropriate for 
these parties.  This is because the good faith purchase problem cannot be solved efficiently with the 
legal strategies that commercial law provides.  Commercial law does not directly create incentives 
for parties to take particular actions, or refrain from those actions.  Rather, the law allocates property 
rights among the relevant agents.  The opportunity to protect or to acquire property rights creates 
whatever incentives commercial law provides and those incentives are inadequate in the good faith 
purchase context.  
 
 Ideally, the owner, O, should invest in precaution until the reduction in the probability of an 
involuntary transfer27 times the goods’ value to her equals the marginal precaution cost.  However, 
the incentive to protect against loss falls to the extent that losses can be undone.    O thus chooses a 
suboptimal precaution level when she is legally entitled to recover lost goods.  Different suboptimal 
incentives drive the buyer’s behavior.  The buyer should invest in ensuring that his title is good until 
the probability of receiving a good title times the goods’ value to him equals the marginal inquiry 
cost.  Buyers choose a lower inquiry level than this because (a) owners may not find goods that they 
are legally entitled to recover; and (b) buyers sometimes can keep goods that they purchase in good 
faith.   
To illustrate the problem that these incentive weaknesses create, consider the American theft 
rule.  As just noted, in order to give O efficient incentives to prevent theft, the right of O to recover 
stolen goods should be completely cut off.   On the other hand, to give B efficient incentives to 
                                                 
25 Much prior analysis overlooks the possibility that owners can sue dealers for conversion.  A notable exception is 
Hanoch Dagan, “The Market Overt as Insurance” (2009) (In Hebrew, English translation on file with the authors). 
26 We argue below, however, that dealer/buyers should face higher damages than ultimate purchasers. 
27 We define an “involuntary transfer” as the theft of goods from O, or a voluntary transfer from O after which the 
transferee sells the goods to another without O’s authorization.  See note 23 supra. 
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purchase only a clear title, O should always be permitted to recover stolen goods.  The theft rule 
creates suboptimal incentives for the owner because she always can recover the goods, but the rule 
creates efficient incentives for the buyer, who always loses.  Reversing the parties’ rights would 
improve the owner’s incentives but at the cost of reducing the buyer’s incentives.  As is apparent, 
commercial law property right allocations cannot create optimal incentives for both O and B in the 
theft context. 28    As a consequence, efficiency is unattainable in the good faith purchase context 
when the law is restricted to allocating property rights.  Scholars have not solved the good faith 
purchase problem because their inquiries largely have been conducted within the commercial law 
paradigm, and no optimal solution can be found there. 
 
A further complication to solving the good faith purchase problem is that the law creates two 
legal obligations that apply to the same goods, thereby complicating the ultimate buyer’s 
maximization problem.  American law is illustrative of this point although it arises as well under the 
laws of those foreign jurisdictions that have a version of the theft rule. 29   Recall that the ultimate 
buyer loses if the property was originally stolen, which creates an incentive for the buyer to inquire 
into the probability of theft.   In contrast, the buyer can keep the goods if they had been delivered 
under a transaction of purchase or entrusted to a merchant and subsequently misappropriated, unless 
the buyer purchased them in bad faith. As we show below, it is less costly for a buyer to establish his 
good faith than it is for him to inquire optimally into the theft possibility.30 Thus, the buyer’s duty of 
care is less under the voidable title and entrustment rules than the optimal precautions the buyer 
should take under the theft rule. When the buyer makes a purchase decision, however, he does not 
know whether the goods had been stolen, delivered or entrusted.  Therefore, he does not know which 
legal duty he must satisfy, and thus how much he should invest in precaution.31   
                                                 
28 In economics, difficulties of this kind are referred to as “double marginalization” problems.  For discussion of  the 
problem of double marginalization in the tort law context, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 203-04 (2004). 
29 All jurisdictions that have adopted the theft also have the voidable title and entrustment rules as well thus creating the 
dilemma for the buyer that is described in the text.  See Appendix infra. 
 
30 See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra. 
31 Canada (Ontario), England and India also apply two rules to the same goods.  In these jurisdictions, the buyer wins if 
the goods were stolen but the owner’s conduct was such as to estop her from asserting her title.  The owner wins, 
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 The considerations set out here suggest that the solution to the incentive problems in the 
good faith purchase context must be found elsewhere than commercial law.   We contend in this 
Essay that the optimal solution would be to abandon commercial law for tort:  Tort solutions are 
regulatory; they directly hold agents to exogenously set standards.  Applied here, a “tort type” 
solution would permit O to recover involuntarily transferred goods unless she was negligent in 
protecting them.  If she had been negligent, then the buyer, B, can keep the goods.32   An owner who 
anticipates being unable to recover the goods if she is negligent will take optimal precautions.  And 
since a negligence rule permits non-negligent owners to recover stolen goods, the rule retains the 
owner’s incentive to search optimally for them.  This proposed negligence rule would make buyers 
strictly liable because they would always lose to non-negligent owners.  Repealing rules that protect 
buyers who purchase in good faith would also raise the inquiry level that buyers would choose.   
Thus, a modified tort solution would improve on the commercial law of good faith purchase but for 
the difficulty of implementing a negligence rule.  
 
 Implementation is a significant concern, however, because the efficient negligence standard 
for protecting goods would require O to choose the precaution level that O voluntarily would have 
chosen if she were optimizing against the goods’ full value to her.  It can be difficult for a court to 
know what that level is.  The goods’ true value when stolen and when recovered and the precaution  
level that O actually chose may not be verifiable to a court.   Further, to set the negligence standard, 
a court would have to know the owner’s “production function” – the precaution choice the owner 
should have made given her costs, values and the available technology.  Production functions are 
difficult for courts to reconstruct. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                   
however, if she was merely negligent.  When an ultimate buyer purchases, he does not know how the original owner 
behaved. 
 
32 In Part III( C), we discuss the cases a negligence solution does not resolve: when O and B both are negligent or when 
neither is negligent.  We argue there that owners should prevail when neither is negligent and buyers should prevail 
when both are negligent.   
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  Despite these difficulties, commercial law’s inescapable limitations motivate us to propose a 
variant of the typical negligence solution.  Our proposal instructs courts to use various verifiable 
proxies for an owner’s negligence.33  In the United States, these proxies can be adopted as part of a 
statutory revision to the UCC.34  Indeed, the UCC now uses a negligence solution, together with 
proxies for negligence, to resolve property right contests between owners and purchasers of 
misappropriated commercial paper.35  In the same vein, we propose, as examples, that O should be 
presumed negligent if she fails to take customary precautions,36 or fails to increase the odds of 
recovery by tagging or marking goods when these identification tactics exist, or fails to make timely 
search for involuntarily transferred goods.37  These proxies correlate with a lack of owner due care 
and courts could apply them, so our modified negligence solution seems promising. 
 
 This proposed solution is incomplete, however, because it does not respond to the under-
enforcement concern that the good faith purchase problem raises.  The concern in tort is that 
substantial subsets of victims do not sue.  Hence, an appropriately set negligence standard actually 
functions suboptimally because the expected liability of a potential injurer is not the damage he 
causes times the probability of harm, but rather the damages of litigious victims times the probability 
of their harm.  The potential injurer takes suboptimal care because his expected liability is less than 
the actual harm he causes.38  The analogue in the good faith purchase context is the inability of every 
                                                 
33 As we show in text accompanying notes 101-02 infra, a court only need consider proxies for negligence by the owner.  
Buyers will have added incentives to take precautions under our proposal but because the buyer will prevail in all 
circumstances where the owner was negligent, there is no need for courts to evaluate buyer conduct independently.  In 
effect, buyers face strict liability. 
 
34 Negligence proxies can also be implemented as revisions to the statutes and civil codes that govern good faith 
purchase contests in all the other commercial jurisdictions.  See Appendix infra. 
 
35 See UCC §§3-404-406 and text accompanying notes 85-88 infra. 
36 An example of a customary standard is the installation of a bugler alarm.  We discuss these proxies in Part III.B infra. 
37 Failure to make reasonable search efforts would include a failure to make a reasonable investigation of a voluntary 
transferee.  This obligation is apt when O would lose to a good faith purchaser and thus, we show, would search 
suboptimally. 
38  SHAVELL, supra note 28 at 285-87. 
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owner to find stolen or misappropriated goods.  A buyer who is strictly liable for buying such goods 
– that is, who must give them up -- would nevertheless take suboptimal care because he optimizes 
against the goods’ actual value discounted by the probability that the owner finds him.  This 
probability almost always is less than one.  Suggested solutions to the under-enforcement concern in 
torts are punitive damages, tort fines or subsidizing litigation (by awarding attorneys fees to 
successful plaintiffs).39  We propose a variant of the tort fine solution: a bad faith dealer/buyer 
should be required to pay a nondisclaimable civil fine to the state.40 
   
 The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II sets out a model of the good faith purchase problem.  
We show that both the American theft rule and the voidable title rule (and its variants entrustment 
and Market Overt) reduce social welfare.  In Part III, we present a reform proposal that encourages 
more efficient precautions by both parties while responding to the verifiability problems that 
otherwise render tort-type solutions impractical. Part IV defends our proposal against certain non-
instrumental objections.  In Part V, we evaluate the good faith purchase laws of the leading 
commercial jurisdictions in light of our analysis. This Part has two goals: to describe the costs of the 
current diversity of solutions to the good faith purchase problem, and to argue that our solution 
improves on the current approaches.  Part VI briefly concludes.   
 
II.   A MODEL OF THE GOOD FAITH PURCHASE PROBLEM 
 
A. Framing the Problem 
  
 In the model we set out below, society moves first by choosing criminal sanctions and a level 
of police activity.  These importantly influence the probability of theft or misappropriation.  The two 
risk neutral agents in our model – the original owner and the ultimate buyer – then choose their own 
precaution level (the owner) and inquiry level (the buyer). The owner takes the effect of the criminal 
law as given when deciding how much precaution to take and how intensively to search for lost 
                                                 
39 Tort fines are discussed in SHAVELL, supra note 28 at 272-75. 
40 See text accompanying notes 70-74 infra. 
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goods.  When the law is an effective deterrent, O spends less on precaution; when deterrence is 
weak, she spends more.  The owner also searches less intensively when police procedures for 
locating lost goods are effective, and searches more intensively when the police are ineffective.  
Similarly, the buyer is more vigilant in checking his seller’s title when the police are more likely to 
locate tainted goods.  The issue we examine is how private law influences the marginal effect of the 
owner’s incentives to protect and to search and the buyer’s incentive to inquire into his seller’s title.   
 
The model’s timing is as follows: 
 
Precaution______Theft?_________Search?_____Find?  _________________ 
                      to       t1                                t2                                    t3 
The owner chooses a precaution level to protect the value the goods have for her; hence, this value is 
denoted v(t0).  The level of precaution the owner chooses is denoted c and the probability that 
precautions are successful in preventing theft is p(c).  The owner searches when the expected value 
of “found goods” exceeds search costs.  The value of the goods themselves is denoted v(t3) because 
the owner cannot find goods until time t3, but the value of found goods has two elements.  First, the 
owner may value the goods more highly than the buyer does when she finds them.  If the law 
permits the owner of stolen goods to recover them, the owner repossesses the goods.  Second, the 
buyer may value the goods more highly than the owner does.  In this case, the buyer will purchase 
the right to keep the goods.  Hence, the value of found goods to the owner, denoted vr, is the sum of 
the expected value of the goods when the owner has the higher valuation and the expected value of 
the price the buyer pays to keep them when he has the higher valuation.41  The cost of owner search 
                                                 
41 Formally,  
 
The term outside the braces is the probability that the goods are stolen times the probability that they are found.  The 
first term in braces is the expected value of the goods if the owner repossesses them; the second term is the expected 
value of the price the buyer pays to keep them (when his value is higher).  The α before the integral indexes the owner’s 
bargaining power (0 < α < 1). 
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is denoted z and the probability that search is productive is x(z).  We initially assume that some level 
of precaution and of search is productive.42  
  
The buyer can investigate to ensure that his seller has a good title to convey.  From the 
buyer’s viewpoint, the probability that the seller can convey a good title is exogenous.  The buyer 
has an initial estimate of this probability and can refine his estimate – inquire into title -- at cost w.  
The buyer’s refined belief that he will purchase a good title is denoted g(w).   The buyer’s subjective 
probability that he can keep what he buys thus is the probability that he assigns to having a good title 
plus the probability he assigns to having a bad title times the probability that the owner never finds 
him.  We write this joint probability as g(w) + (1 - g(w))(1 - x(z)).43  If the law instead would always 
permit a buyer to keep goods that he purchased in good faith, then the buyer would believe that he 
can retain the goods with probability g(w’), where w’ is the cost of proving good faith to a court, not 
the cost of an optimal inquiry into whether the buyer’s vendor is authorized to sell.  In the United 
States, these costs differ (w ≠w’).  The buyer values the goods at vb.  
  
 The owner’s incentive to invest in theft protection and the buyer’s investment in getting good 
title are (weak) substitutes:  The more the owner invests in precaution, the smaller is the pool of 
stolen goods in commerce, so the lower is the inquiry level it is optimal for buyers to choose.  
Similarly, the more the buyer invests in checking title, the more difficult it is for thieves to sell 
stolen goods, so the lower is the precaution level it is optimal for owners to choose.  On the other 
hand, the owner’s incentive to search once goods are stolen and the buyer’s incentive to ensure good 
                                                 
42 Technically, we assume that the marginal benefit of precaution and search are positive, starting at the zero level; that 
precaution and search costs are convex; and that it is suboptimal to protect or search infinitely.  The assumption that the 
optimal level of precaution exceeds zero is motivated in note 46, infra.  The assumption that the owner always searches 
is relaxed below.  There seems no reason to believe, as a general matter, that v(t0)  is higher or lower than v(t3) .  Some 
goods may fall in value due to later use or abuse.  Other goods, such as art and jewelry, may increase in value.  As a 
practical matter, owners only search for valuable goods so the conflicts the law must resolve, and thus the domain of our 
analysis, concern valuable goods. 
 
43 Recall that the probability that the owner finds stolen goods is x(z), so the probability that the goods remain hidden is 
1 - x(z). 
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title are complements:  Search increases the probability that stolen goods are found, so buyer 
investments in ensuring good title become more productive as owner search increases.44  
 
B. First Best and the “Double Marginalization” Problem 
  
Efficiency requires the owner to optimize against the goods’ value to her.   Society protects 
an owner’s property rights, on the economic view, for two reasons.  First, in a decentralized 
economic system wealth is maximized when owners invest in increasing the value of the property 
they own.  The productivity of owner investment falls as the probability of theft increases.  Put more 
simply, owners are less likely to invest if they cannot keep what they produce.45  Thus, taking the 
criminal law as background, society wants to enlist owners in its theft reduction program.  This goal 
implies that owners should take precautions to protect their goods against theft.  Second, a buyer 
who purchases goods values them more highly in expectation than does the owner.  A thief may or 
may not have a higher valuation.  Hence, the probability that goods move to a higher valued user is 
lower under theft than under trade.46  This reasoning also implies that society prefers owners to 
assist in theft reduction.  The social preference thus holds that owners should take precautions 
against theft or misappropriation to protect the value that goods have for their owners.   
  
                                                 
44 Our model is similar to the model in William Landes & Richard A. Posner, “The Economics of Legal Disputes Over 
the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles,” in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS (V.A. Ginsburgh 
and P.M. Menger, eds. 1996).  Landes and Posner’s excellent analysis of the art market omits dealers, assumes that the 
owner can recover stolen art with certainty, the owner and the buyer place the same value on stolen goods, the buyer 
attempts to conceal his possession, and parties function under some legal uncertainty.  These assumptions are plausible 
for the art market but not generally so we do not make them.  For example, the buyer of a stolen Matisse may display it 
in a locked room, but the buyer of a stolen machine must openly use it.  Also, because Landes and Posner focus on the 
art market, they do not derive generally applicable legal reforms nor do they make a comparative law analysis.  A 
thoughtful, unpublished paper by Omri Ben-Shahar, “Property Rights in Goods: An Economic Analysis” (1998) (on file 
with the authors), also considers the incentives of owners and buyers.  Ben-Shahar stays largely within the property 
rights paradigm and omits dealers but he helpfully integrates the thief’s incentives into the owner’s problem.  Doing this 
here would not change our policy proposals.  Ben-Shahar also does not consider how courts could apply a negligence 
solution, nor does he make a comparative analysis. 
45 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31-33 (7TH ED. 2007); Cf, Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics 
and the Law of Property, 24 Nomos 3, 25 (1982). 
46 POSNER, supra note 45, at 205. 
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Owners therefore should choose the precaution level that maximizes the following 
expression: 
Maxc (p(c))v(t0) - c   
The solution is 
(1)   p’(c)v(t0) = 1 
 
The owner should invest in precaution until the expected marginal increase in the return to 
protecting goods – the left hand side of (1) – equals the marginal cost of protection – the right hand 
side of (1).  We denote this socially optimal level of care c*.   
  
The reasons that should lead society to prefer having the owner optimize against the goods 
value to her also imply that the buyer should optimize against the goods value to him when he 
inquires into his seller’s title.  Assume then that (a) the law permits O always to recover stolen goods 
and (b) O always finds them.  These assumptions imply that the privately optimal level of buyer 
inquiry equals the socially optimal level.  The buyer’s problem, on the two assumptions, is to choose 
the investigation level that maximizes the following expression: 
Maxw g(w)vb - w 
The solution is 
(2)  g’(w)vb = 1 
 
The buyer invests in inquiry until the expected marginal increase in the value of retaining goods – 
the left hand side of (2) – equals the marginal cost of investigation – the right hand side of (2).  This 
level of inquiry, denoted w*, equals the level of care that society prefers.  Therefore, the law should 
permit O always to recover stolen or misappropriated goods in order to ensure that B invests w*.47  
                                                 
47 The representation of the buyer’s problem above is oversimplified.  The buyer actually faces what is called an optimal 
stopping problem.  He should incur inquiry costs in checking title until it is optimal for him to stop, which is when the 
probability that the seller’s title is good is sufficiently high to make further inquiries not worth their cost, or when the 
probability that the seller’s title is bad is sufficiently high as also to make further inquiry not cost justified. The 
mathematical representation of optimal stopping problems is complex.  The complexity is unnecessary for our purposes. 
In an optimal stopping model, the buyer will stop searching too soon because he discounts the productivity of search by 
the likelihood that the owner will not find him. The text represents the buyer’s problem as choosing a level of inquiry 
into title because this yields the same result in a more intuitively obvious way.  
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 Social welfare always is below first best in any commercial law regime for two reasons.  
First, the law cannot permit O always and never to recover stolen goods; nor can B be permitted 
always and never to keep stolen goods.  This is a variant of the double marginalization problem.   
There is no first best solution to problems of this kind.  Second, because the law cannot ensure that 
O always finds stolen goods, B necessarily behaves suboptimally: the probability he assigns to 
retaining stolen goods is not g(w), his updated belief that the goods were not stolen, but this belief 
times the probability that the owner does not find him.  
 
C. Parties’ Behavior Under the American Rules. 
  
1. The Theft Rule. 
 a. The owner’s problem:  We initially assume that the owner can recover stolen goods from 
a good faith purchaser.  Under this rule, the owner’s problem has two aspects: to reduce the 
probability of theft and to locate stolen goods.  To solve this problem, we begin at the last stage, 
after goods have been stolen.   The owner’s payoff from searching for the goods is the expected 
value of recovery (the probability of finding the goods times their then value for her) less search 
costs.  The owner chooses the level of search that maximizes this payoff: 
Maxz x(z)vr – z. 
The solution to this problem is 
(3)   x’(z)vr = 1. 
 
The owner invests in the search for stolen goods until the expected marginal increase in the return 
from locating them – the left hand side of (3) -- equals the marginal cost of search – the right hand 
side of (3).  This is the first best search level, which we denote z*.   O searches efficiently because, 
under the assumed rule, she can recover any goods she finds. 
 
 Turning to the initial stage, before the goods have been stolen, the owner’s payoff from 
continuing to own the goods is the expected value of protecting the goods less her precaution cost 
plus the expected value of recovering stolen goods less the cost of searching for them.  She therefore 
must choose the precaution level that maximizes this payoff.   
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Maxc, p(c)v(t0) + δT{(1 - p(c))[x(z*)vr – z*]} - c 
 
The first term is the expected value to the owner of foiling theft (the probability of keeping the 
goods times their value).  The second term is the expected value of recovering stolen goods, 
conditional on searching optimally for them: the probability that the goods are stolen times the 
probability that the goods are found times the value of found goods, and less the cost of searching.  
The last term is the owner’s precaution cost.  The payoff to recovering stolen goods is discounted 
back to when the owner chooses a precaution level because lost goods take time to find.48  The 
solution to the owner’s maximization problem is  
(4)  p’(c){v(t0) - [δT (x(z*)vr – z*]} = 1 
 
 The left hand side of Expression (4) is lower than the left hand side of Expression (1), the 
expression for social welfare, because the bracketed term in (4) is positive (the owner does not 
search unless the expected gain from search exceeds the cost).   The owner thus chooses a 
suboptimal precaution level.  Denoting as co the privately optimal level of owner precaution that 
solves Expression (4), we have  c0 < c*.  Intuitively, O’s incentive to prevent theft is too low because 
she may recover the goods.49      The disincentive to take precautions that the possibility of recovery 
creates is partly mitigated by the cost of delay. The longer it takes to locate stolen goods, the lower 
is the payoff to recovering them so the higher is the payoff to preventing theft initially.50 
                                                 
48 The analysis assumes that the goods are not found until time T so the discount factor is δT. 
49 To make this result clear, if O could promptly recover stolen goods, her incentive to prevent theft falls to zero.  
Formally, the T in Expression (4) would be zero so we would have  δT = 1; x(z) = 1; and vr → v(t0) .  The term in braces 
in Expression (4) would then be negative so O would take no precautions at all.  As shown, for first best efficiency the 
bracketed term should be zero so the left hand side of (4) should be p’(c)v(t0).  When the owner can recover stolen 
goods, she chooses a precaution level such that the bracketed term lies between zero and one, which is inefficient. 
50 Formally, δ < 1 so the discount factor δT becomes smaller as T, the time to find stolen goods, gets bigger.  The 
owner’s incentive to prevent theft increases toward the socially optimal level as the second term in braces in Expression 
(4) falls.  We justify here an important assumption.  Under the current theft rule, the owner may take no precautions and 
still recover stolen goods.  To pursue this effect of the theft rule, denote the probability of no theft when the owner takes 
no precautions as p(0) and the expected value of found goods – the bracketed term in the owner’s maximization problem 
– as [•].  Let Δp = p(c0)  - p(0).  Here Δp measures the productivity of precautions: the bigger it is the more productive 
precautions are.  Then, saving the algebra, O takes some precaution when ΔpδT{v(t0) - [•]} > c.  Intuitively, O takes 
some precaution when precaution is productive (Δp is big); the owner values the goods highly (v(t0) is big); and the 
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 b. The buyer’s problem:  The buyer’s payoff from purchasing is the expected value of the 
goods to him if he gets a good title (the goods were not stolen) or if his title is bad but the owner 
never locates the goods.  The buyer’s problem is to choose the investigation level that maximizes 
this payoff:  
Maxw vb[g(w) + (1 - g(w))(1 - x(z*)] - w 
 
The first term in brackets is the probability that the buyer assigns to purchasing a good title; the 
second term is the joint probability that his title is defective but despite optimal owner search he is 
not found; and the last term is the buyer’s inquiry cost.   
The solution is 
(5)  g’(w)vb(x(z*)) = 1 
 
We denote as wo the privately optimal level of inquiry that satisfies Expression (5).  Were x(z*), the 
probability that the owner finds the buyer, to equal one, Expression (5) would reduce to Expression 
(2): the buyer’s inquiry level would more closely approach the social preference.  As x(z*) 
commonly is less than one, the buyer reduces his investigation level below this optimum (wo < w*).  
Intuitively, B’s return from inquiring into his seller’s title falls as the likelihood that B will lose the 
goods falls.  As is apparent, the buyer’s investigation level is increasing in x(z*) so owner search 
and buyer inquiry are complements: as O increases her search, B’s inquiries into title become more 
productive.   
  
 We summarize the analysis to here in Proposition One:  
  
                                                                                                                                                                   
expected value of finding the goods is low ([•] is small).  A way to put the last factor is that the owner takes precautions 
to prevent theft when the likelihood of finding stolen goods is low or when the value of found goods is much less than 
the value of goods when originally owned (vr << v(t0).   To be sure, delay does not necessarily reduce the value of 
discovery in all cases.  For example, the owner in pursuing an action in conversion against the buyer may be able to 
recover the depreciated value of found goods. 
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When the owner can recover stolen goods, she takes suboptimal precautions to prevent theft 
but searches optimally for stolen goods; the buyer takes suboptimal precautions to ensure 
that he receives a good title. 
 
 2. The Voidable Title Rule (and its Variants: Entrustment and Market Overt). 
  
Consider now the voidable title exception to the American theft rule.  Recall that under the 
voidable title rule a transferee who wrongfully misappropriates the goods receives a voidable title if 
the owner “delivered [the goods] under a transaction of purchase.”51  A party with voidable title can 
convey a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.52  The owner thus cannot recover goods that 
the initial transferee misappropriated.  In the usual case, the transferee/thief53 pays by check or the 
sale is denominated “for cash.”  The thief’s title is voidable because the owner can recover the goods 
from him if the check is dishonored or the cash is not paid.54  The thief, however, sells the goods to a 
third party.   
 
 The owner takes greater precautions to prevent theft under this rule than under the stolen 
goods rule because she is less likely to recover the goods.  The owner, however, searches less for 
misappropriated goods under this rule for the same reason.  Formally, the probability that O can 
recover the goods now is the product of the probability that she finds them times the probability that 
the buyer fails to persuade a court that he purchased in good faith.  We let g(w’) be the probability 
that the buyer is persuasive at cost w’.  Then the probability that the owner can recover  
misappropriated  goods is x(z)(1 - g(w’)), which we denote x(zvt).  The probability that the owner 
actually recovers misappropriated goods is less than the probability that the owner finds the buyer 
(x(zvt) < x(z*)).  This is because the probability that a court will find B to have purchased in bad 
                                                 
51 UCC §2-403(1). 
 
52 Id. 
53 Even though the goods in this case are not “stolen” from the owner but rather are misappropriated, it is appropriate to 
designate this transferee as a “thief” because his acquisition of the goods is accomplished through “larceny by trick.” 
54 E.g., Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc.2d 168, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1967). 
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faith is less than one (0 ≤ (1 - g(w’) < 1).  Intuitively, the buyer may persuade the court that he acted 
in good faith so there is a positive probability that O cannot recover the goods even if she finds 
them.  O chooses an inefficiently low search level because the probability that she can recover 
misappropriated goods is less than the probability that she can recover stolen goods (x(zvt) < x(z*)).  
In sum, the voidable title rule reduces the owner’s precaution inefficiency but creates a search   
inefficiency. 55   
  
 To understand the effect of a voidable title rule on buyers, assume initially that only this rule 
applies.56  The buyer now keeps the goods if (a) the owner does not find him; or (b) the owner finds 
him but a court finds that he purchased in good faith.  On the assumption that only one rule applies, 
the buyer’s problem is to choose the level of inquiry that maximizes his payoff from purchasing: 
 
Maxw’ vb[(1 - (x(zvt)) + x(z(vvt)g(w’)] - w’. 
 
The first term in brackets is the probability that the owner cannot find the buyer; the  second term is 
the probability that the owner finds the buyer times the probability that the buyer is found to be in 
good faith.  The last term in the Expression is the buyer’s cost when he must appear to be in good 
faith.  The solution to the buyer’s problem is 
 
(6) g’(w’)[vb(x(zvt))] = 1 
  
 Comparing Expressions (5) and (6), the buyer chooses a lower inquiry level under the 
voidable title rule than under the theft rule for two reasons.  First, the probability that the owner 
recovers misappropriated goods is less than the probability that the owner recovers stolen goods 
because the owner reduces her search intensity.  Consequently, the buyer invests less in inquiry.  
                                                 
55 Summarizing the reasoning above, when the term x(zvt) is substituted in O’s maximization problem, the second term 
in brackets in the solution, Expression (4), becomes smaller so the left hand side of (4) becomes larger, implying that O 
chooses a higher precaution level.  Denoting the precaution level that O chooses under the voidable title rule cvt, we have 
c0 < cvt < c*.  Expression (3), however, changes to (x(zvt))vr = 1, which reflects a suboptimal level of search. 
 
56 Our assumption here accurately describes jurisdictions that adopt the market overt rule, which protects good faith 
purchasers from merchants. 
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The logic here is that inquiry is less productive for B when he is less likely to be discovered.  The 
second factor is more subtle.  Again comparing the two solutions to the buyer’s problem, B would 
inquire less under the voidable title rule if g’(w’) < g’(w); that is, if the marginal cost of establishing 
good faith is less than the marginal cost of insuring that his title is good.  This inequality would be 
satisfied were it easier for the buyer to appear to act in good faith than to ensure that he had a good 
title.  To see why, assume that it would cost the buyer $100 to reduce by one percent the probability 
that he is offered misappropriated goods but it would only cost the buyer $50 to reduce by one 
percent the probability that a court will find the buyer to have purchased in bad faith.  Then, if the 
legal rule requires the buyer only to persuade the court that he is acting in good faith, B at the 
margin will invest less in inquiring into his seller’s title. 
  
 As it happens, United States commercial law does create a relaxed standard of inquiry for 
buyers.   Section 1-201(20) of the UCC defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance 
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”57  The comment to this section confirms that 
good faith requires less of the buyer than taking good care would require: “‘fair dealing’ ... is 
concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an act is performed.  This is 
an entirely different concept than whether a person exercised ordinary care in conducting a 
transaction.”58  
 
 We summarize the analysis of the voidable title rule with Proposition Two. 
 
The voidable title rule increases an owner’s incentive to invest optimally in precautions to prevent 
involuntary transfer but decreases the owner’s incentive to search optimally for transferred goods.  
The rule decreases the buyer’s incentive to ensure that he is purchasing a good title.  
 
The voidable title rule is inefficient in two respects.  First, there is no reason to believe that the 
competing effects summarized in Proposition Two offset.  Hence, the voidable title rule is ex ante 
                                                 
57 UCC §1-201(20). 
 
58 UCC §1-201(20) Comment. 
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inefficient.  Second, while an owner probably values her goods more highly than the thief does, the 
owner may or may not value the goods more highly than the ultimate buyer does.  Therefore, society 
should want owners and buyers to bargain over which of them should ultimately be the owner.  The 
search dampening effect of the voidable title rule reduces the likelihood of such bargains below the 
likelihood that the theft rule yields.  The voidable title rule thus is ex post inefficient as well.   
 
 This analysis applies to all voidable title cases, but it may be helpful to note its application as 
well to the United States entrusting rule and the Market Overt rule that applies in a number of other 
countries.  Entrustment and Market Overt are particular species of the voidable title genus.  For 
example, the entrustment rule provides that an owner who entrusts his goods “to a merchant who 
deals in goods of that kind” cannot recover the goods from a buyer who purchased them “in the 
ordinary course of business.”59  An ordinary course purchase is made in good faith from a “merchant 
who deals in goods of that kind.”60  Similarly, the Market Overt rule protects a good faith purchaser 
for value who buys stolen goods from a merchant dealer.61  Both of these rules are defective in the 
ways that the voidable title rule is defective.62 
   
To summarize, the American theft rule reduces to below first best the owner’s incentive to 
take precautions because the owner can recover stolen goods, but it creates first best incentives for 
the owner to search for stolen goods because she can reclaim them.  The voidable title rule – as well 
as the Market Overt rule that is followed in one form or another in many countries and the 
entrustment rule in the UCC -- have the opposite effect: this class of  rules increases the incentive of 
the owner to take precautions to prevent the initial transfer to the misappropriating transferee 
because the probability that she can recover the goods falls; conversely, this class of rules reduces 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
59 See UCC §§2-403(2). 
 
60 See UCC § 1-201(9). 
 
61 See, e.g., Israel (Sale of Goods (1968) §34 (good faith purchaser of stolen goods from merchant dealer who takes 
possession of the goods prevails over rights of the original owner). 
 
62 See text accompanying notes 49-55 infra. 
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the owner’s incentive to search for misappropriated goods because the probability that she can 
recover them also falls.  The American rules are inefficient in another way.  Propositions One and 
Two show that the buyer has different incentives to inquire into title under the theft rule than he has 
under the voidable title rule.  When the buyer makes a purchase decision, however, he does not 
know the goods’ “legal origin”—whether the goods were stolen, delivered under a transaction of 
purchase or entrusted.  The buyer thus will not choose the inquiry level that would be optimal for 
him under either rule.63   
 
3. The Impossibility of Ranking. 
 
 We have shown here that every rule is inefficient in some respect, but we have not evaluated 
the contribution each rule makes to social welfare.  Private information precludes this inquiry.  To 
see why, assume that a well motivated social planner wants to reduce the expected costs of theft to 
society, defined for convenience here as the probability of theft under a legal regime times the value 
of lost goods.  Owner precautions reduce theft by making it more costly for thieves to steal or 
misappropriate.  Buyer inquiries into title reduce the gains to theft by reducing the demand for 
tainted goods.  Owner search increases buyer precautions and so also has a demand dampening 
effect on theft. 
 
 The social planner would like to allocate the property right to the party who is most 
productive in reducing theft.  To see how she might go about this, denote the marginal productivity 
of owner precautions as MPo and the marginal productivity of buyer inquiries as MPb.  Now 
consider a move from the theft rule to the Market Overt rule.  The move would increase the owner’s 
incentive to take precautions.  The social gain is ∆MPo.  The move would also reduce the buyer’s 
incentive to inquire because the owner searches less and because the good faith standard requires 
less of the buyer than an optimal inquiry requires.  The social loss from reducing the buyer’s 
incentives is ∆MPb.  Therefore, moving from the theft rule to the Market Overt rule would create a 
net welfare gain if ∆MPo - ∆MPb > 0. 
                                                 
63 A sophisticated buyer may assign probabilities to the various legal possibilities and then choose an intermediate 
inquiry level.  There is no reason to believe that the result would be more efficient than the result either rule alone 
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The social planner, however, could not recover the information to make this comparison.  
The marginal productivities require “local knowledge” to evaluate, such as how effective guarding a 
particular warehouse would be as opposed to how effective purchasing only from reputable stores 
that sold the warehoused goods would be. The planner thus would have difficulty evaluating a 
particular context, and would face insurmountable difficulties globally because the efficiency 
calculus varies across contexts.   As we argue above, however, society should want owners and 
buyers to invest to protect the value that goods have for them.  Hence, efficient private acts to 
prevent theft or dampen the return to theft advance the social goal.  As a consequence, private law 
should attempt to move parties as close to their optimal precaution levels as is possible.  In Part II 
we have shown how current law falls short of this goal.  In Part III, we next develop a proposal for 
reform. 
 
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION:  NEGLIGENCE PROXIES 
 
 The owner’s incentives can be improved under a negligence rule that permits her to recover 
the goods only if she invested efficiently in care.  The rule would require the owner to choose the 
precaution level that she would have chosen if she could not recover lost goods.  An owner would 
retain her property right only if she satisfied the negligence standard.  Hence, if workable the 
standard would increase the owner’s precaution level to first best without worsening her incentive to 
search for stolen goods.64  Buyers, in effect, are strictly liable under this proposal: they always lose 
to non-negligent owners.  A negligence rule is necessary for owners because they face conflicting 
incentives.  An owner’s incentive to take precautions is partly counter-balanced by her ability to 
recover stolen goods.  The owner’s precaution level must be regulated directly to overcome this 
offsetting effect.  In contrast, buyers need only inquire into their seller’s title, so strict liability can 
                                                                                                                                                                   
induces. 
64 See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra. Formally, a negligence rule, if effective, changes the owner’s maximization 
problem to the problem that Expression (1) solves rather than the problem that Expression (4) solves.  The owner, that 
is, is induced to take first best precautions.  The standard does not affect the problem that Expression (3) solves because 
the owner does not search for goods unless she loses them. 
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helpfully move the buyer closer to the optimal inquiry level.  An additional virtue of a broad 
negligence rule is its unitary property: the rule would apply both to stolen and misappropriated 
goods so the buyer would know what inquiry level the law seeks to induce. 
 
The negligence rule that we propose dominates two other possible solutions to the good faith 
purchase problem.  The first is to have stolen or misappropriated goods escheat to the state.  The 
virtue of this reform is that both the owner and the buyer would then take optimal precautions 
because they both lose the goods.  The defect of the proposal is that it eliminates the owners’ 
incentive to search for lost goods.  A negligence rule is preferable to the escheat rule because 
negligence also creates optimal incentives for owners, if negligence would work, while retaining the 
owners’ optimal incentive to search.  The second solution is to use a comparative negligence rule.65 
Such a rule cannot be adopted in its simple version because property seldom is divisible.  An owner 
who is 60% negligent cannot be given 40% of a Rembrandt.  Thus, comparative negligence could 
work only if the state auctioned off stolen or misappropriated goods and divided the proceeds 
according to the parties’ negligence.   Given the volume and variety of stolen goods, the additional 
deterrence such a procedure would generate likely would be below the procedure’s costs. 
 
Part IIIA shows how a negligence solution ameliorates the inefficiencies noted above.   This 
Part assumes that courts can directly observe negligent behavior.  In Part IIIB, we relax this 
sometimes unrealistic assumption to argue that courts can observe “proxy behaviors” that correlate 
well with the presence of negligence.  Finally, in Part IIIC we discuss optimal property rules for 
cases when neither party is negligent or when both parties are negligent.  
 
A. The Case for Negligence Rules 
1. Theft 
                                                 
65 Under a comparative negligence rule, if both the injurer and the victim fail to take due care, each party bears a 
fraction of the accident losses.  The fraction is based on a comparison of the degree to which each party’s actual 
precautions departed from the optimal level. The incentive effects of a comparative negligence rule are discussed in 
SHAVELL, supra note 28 at 187.  As we note below, the current version of Article 3 of the UCC adopts a comparative 
negligence rule in allocating responsibility between owners and good faith purchasers of forged or altered negotiable 
instruments.  See note 84 infra, and UCC §§ 3-404 - 3-406 (2009). 
  
 28
  
We begin with the theft case.  Under current law, O chooses the protection level that co achieves 
rather than the higher optimal level c* because she can recover stolen goods.  Under our proposal, O 
cannot recover stolen goods unless she invests c*.   To see why the owner will comply with a 
negligence rule, let her first consider choosing a lesser precaution level, c < c*.  If she chooses c, 
then she cannot recover the goods.  But realizing that she cannot recover the goods, she revises and 
instead chooses the optimal level c*.66   The search for stolen goods necessarily begins after the 
owner has invested in precaution.  The owner then has a right to recover the goods because she had 
invested c*.  When she has this right, she chooses the optimal search level z*.67  
 
 The buyer optimally chooses a lower inquiry level if the seller is subject to an effective 
negligence rule because the probability that goods are stolen falls.  Nevertheless, the buyer’s inquiry 
level is inefficiently low because the owner may not find him.  The “finding probability” is 
unchanged under a seller negligence rule because the owner searches optimally both under current   
law and under the proposed reform.  We summarize this reasoning in the following Proposition 
Three: 
 
If an owner can recover stolen goods only if she chose the optimal precaution level to protect 
against theft, the owner voluntarily chooses the optimal precaution level and the optimal search 
level.  The buyer of stolen goods continues to invest too little in checking title because the owner 
may not find him. 
  
                                                 
66 See Part II.B, supra. 
 
67 See Proposition (1), supra.   Note that the presence of owner’s insurance should not negatively affect the incentives to 
search for stolen goods, as the insurer is subrogated to the owner’s rights: the insurer, that is, has an absolute right to 
keep what it finds.  Hence, the insurer would search efficiently so as to reduce losses from settling claims.   On the other 
hand, a negligence rule will increase the insurer’s incentives to monitor the actions of the insured and to assist in 
precautions against theft:  more effective precautions by the owner will reduce the insurer’s risk exposure.  Thus, by 
raising premiums or deductibles, or by requiring certain precautions (e.g., an alarm system attached to a valuable 
painting), insurers can induce conduct that the owner would not otherwise have taken.   In addition, insurers can provide 
valuable expertise in devising more effective means of deterring losses. For discussion see Victor P. Goldberg, The 
Devil Made Me Do It:  The Corporate Purchase of  Insurance, 5 Rev.  L. & Econ 1 (2009)..   
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2. Voidable title 
 
Under the current voidable title rule, the owner chooses the higher (but still suboptimal) 
precaution level cvt because her chance of recovering misappropriated goods is less than under the 
theft rule.  But conversely, the owner chooses a lower search level zvt  for the same reason: she has 
less chance of recovering the goods.  A negligence rule would bar the owner’s recovery unless the 
owner optimally investigated potential transferees: that is, unless she invested c*.68  An owner who 
did choose c*would have an absolute right to recover the goods; and this would induce her to invest 
optimally in search.   
 
 The buyer chooses an inefficiently low level of inquiry in the voidable title case for two 
reasons: the owner may not find him, and it costs buyers less to appear to be in good faith than to 
make a due care inquiry.  A broad negligence rule for owners eliminates the second reason: the 
buyer cannot keep the goods if a non-negligent owner finds him.  This reasoning leads to 
Proposition Four: 
 
If an owner can recover voluntarily transferred but misappropriated goods only if she 
chooses an optimal precaution level, the owner behaves efficiently regarding both precaution 
and search.  The buyer chooses a higher inquiry level than under current law, because he 
always loses if the owner finds him, but this level remains suboptimal because the owner may 
not find him. 
  
The proposed negligence rule is incomplete, however, because the good faith purchase 
problem raises a variant of the under-enforcement concern.  In accident law, the concern is that 
potential injurers take suboptimal care because not every victim sues for compensation.69  In good 
faith purchase law, the parallel concern is that buyers will take suboptimal care because not every 
                                                 
68 Here precaution entails optimally investigating a transferee. 
 
69 For discussion, see Steven Shavell,  The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 
J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982). 
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owner finds her goods.  The two standard solutions to the under-enforcement concern seem inapt in 
our context.  One solution is to require the injurer to pay punitive damages, which are the grossed up 
value of the losses of those victims who sue; the other solution is to make a losing defendant pay the 
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.70  Few individual buyers could respond in punitive damages,71 and paying 
attorneys’ fees also may unduly tax the resources of individual buyer defendants. 
 
 A third solution, requiring dealer/buyers to pay nondisclaimable civil tort fines to the state, is 
more promising.72  The details of a tort fine scheme require more attention than this paper gives, but 
its essence can be briefly sketched.  Under the proposal, the losing party – owner or buyer – is 
authorized to report to a state consumer protection agency a dealer who sold stolen or 
misappropriated goods.  The agency would levy and collect the fine.  The losing party should be 
encouraged to report by being awarded a small fraction of the fine.73 The fine should be set by 
statute as a multiplier of the value of the affected goods, with the multiplier reflecting the local 
likelihood that stolen goods are recovered. 
 
 The combination of negligence rules and dealer fines would, in theory, materially improve 
the private incentives of the parties involved in good faith purchase contests.  Thus, it is worth 
exploring whether the idea is practical.  In order to implement such a proposal two assumptions must 
hold:  (1) a court can specify the optimal negligence standard for owners, c*; (2) parties can verify 
                                                 
70 For discussion, see Peter Menell, A Note on the Private versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. 
Legal Stud. 41 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. Legal Stud. 371(1986); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence between Social and Private Incentive to Sue:  A Comment on 
Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. Legal Stud. 483 (1987). 
 
71 Under a gross up solution, let there be Q owners whose goods were stolen, and let q of them find the ultimate buyer.  
Then a buyer faces the probability q/Q = α of being dispossessed.  Such a buyer would have to pay vr/α as damages.  
This liability could be large because the probability of being found, α, usually is small. 
72 The benefit of using civil fines to improve incentives was first proposed in Michael Spence, Consumer 
Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Producer Liability, 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 561 (1977). 
 
73 The full fine should not be paid to the losing party because that would defeat the incentives the negligence solution 
creates.  A small bounty is needed, however, to insure that a nontrivial fraction of losing parties report that their dealer 
sold untitled goods. 
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compliance with c*, or its absence, to a court.  These assumptions may not hold in many real world 
contexts given the difficulties of establishing and verifying complying with negligence standards by 
direct proof.74  In Part IIIB, we next argue that verifiable proxies for the real variables of interest do 
exist, and that those proxies are likely to reduce substantially the verification costs associated with a 
negligence standard.  
 
 
B. Using Proxies to Ameliorate the Verifiability Concern 
 
We have argued that our proposed negligence solution would improve on the commercial 
law of good faith purchase but for the difficulty of implementing a negligence rule.  Implementation 
is a significant concern because the efficient negligence standard for protecting goods would require 
O to choose the precaution level that O would voluntarily have chosen if she were optimizing 
against the goods’ full value to her.  It can be difficult for a court to determine what level of care that 
requires in particular cases.   For this reason, commercial law uses pure negligence concepts 
infrequently.  To be sure, notions of fault infuse contract and commercial law, ranging from 
prescriptions against intentional “bad behavior,” to assessments of the reasonableness of an actor’s 
behavior in assessing both liability and damages.  The Restatement of Contracts identifies many of 
the fault principles that can be invoked in discrete settings, and whose availability is thought to 
justify a core strict liability regime.75   
 
                                                 
74 The difficulty of verifying compliance with broad negligence standards has been noted.  See e.g., Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E. 2d 426 (N.Y. 1991) (criticizing a proposal to impose a due diligence obligation 
on the owner on the ground that “the facts of this case reveal how difficult it would be to specify the type of conduct that 
would be required for a showing of reasonable diligence.”) Id. at  430.)  The court also stated that “it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence requirement.”  Id. at 431. For discussion, see Hawkins, Rothman & 
Goldstein, A Tale of Two Innocents, supra note 5 at 80-83, and Ben-Shahar, supra note 44. 
75 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter 11, Introductory Note at 309-12 (1981). 
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 Strong efficiency arguments can support a “tort-type” analysis of party behavior in particular 
cases, but courts generally reject negligence for commercial law in order to reduce uncertainty.76 
Typical negligence regimes use broad standards (i.e., “duty”, “reasonableness”).  Courts commonly 
have more difficulty verifying compliance with such standards than with rules, such as the theft rule 
and its various exceptions.77  As a consequence, importing negligence concepts into commercial law 
could create uncertainty, and thereby impair parties’ ability to predict how their deals will be 
evaluated.78  It also is more costly for parties to litigate negligence issues than to litigate rules 
because enforcing a negligence standard requires layers of evidence production.79  For example, 
under a negligence standard a party must first propose to the court the activities that constitute 
“reasonable care” and then provide evidence that she performed them.80 The court must then choose 
an operative “proxy” against which to measure a party’s performance:81  What observable (range of) 
outcomes should count in determining whether (a range of) unobservable behavior would be 
                                                 
76 The strong preference for strict liability in common law contract exists although contract doctrine appears in some 
areas to invite a negligence analysis.  For example, if a promisor carelessly fails to take efficient precautions ex ante 
which results in breach ex post, the “willful breach doctrine” invites courts to increase damages to deter such inefficient 
behavior.   Yet an analysis of decided cases shows that courts decline to employ the doctrine to deter an inefficient 
breach.  Similarly, if the promisee fails to take efficient precautions prior to the breach that would reduce or eliminate 
losses, the mitigation principle invites courts to apply a “contributory negligence” bar to recovery.  Yet courts adhere 
strictly to the rule that the promisee’s mitigation responsibility is not triggered until the promisor breaches.  For a 
discussion of plausible reasons why courts adhere to strict liability in these settings, see Robert E. Scott, In (Partial ) 
Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich, L. Rev. 1381 (2009). 
 
77 For discussion, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L. J. 
814 (2006). 
78 For discussion see Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1187 (2001). 
79 Scott & Triantis, supra note 78 at 836-39. 
 
80 Id. To illustrate, assume parties wish to pair particular future contingencies to corresponding performance obligations, 
i.e., when X occurs, the promisor must pay $Y.  The parties can define X in several ways.  X may be a rule: it conditions 
on a relatively specific fact, such as the delivery of a widget with a specified weight.  Here, parties delegate to the court 
only the determination of what evidence is sufficient to satisfy X.  Alternatively, X can be a standard, such as the 
delivery of a widget in excellent condition.  Here the court must determine not only what evidence is sufficient to 
establish the weight of the widget, but also the degree to which weight is relevant to the determination of whether the 
widget satisfies the standard. Scott & Triantis, supra note – at 826. 
81 We use the term “proxy” in this Article to describe what proceduralists refer to as the “operative facts” that are 
relevant to establishing compliance with rules or standards.  A precise rule narrowly confines the content of the 
operative facts.  Indeed, in the limiting case the rule directly specifies the evidentiary proxy.  A vague standard defines a 
broader space within which a court can select the evidentiary proxy that best establishes compliance with the standard. 
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“reasonable”?  The evidentiary proxies a court selects in applying a negligence standard inevitably 
send a noisier signal to future parties than either the parties’ direct observation of their own actions 
or a judicial determination of the conformity of an act to a rule requiring that act.  
 
 The verification problem is much reduced when repeated transactions establish behavioral 
patterns that can serve as useful proxies for negligent behavior.82  Thus, compliance with customs in 
the trade and with established professional standards are recognized proxies for reasonable care in 
evaluating claims that careless commercial or professional behavior caused physical injury.83  
Indeed, at the limit, a proxy for negligence can specify a single instance in the form of a per se rule, 
so that non-compliance is negligence as a matter of law.  In most jurisdictions, for example, an 
unexcused violation of a statute is negligence per se.84  
 
  The use of proxies and per se rules to make negligence standards justicible also appears in 
the law of commercial paper.85  We first describe and then build on this wisdom because there are 
similarities between the theft or misappropriation of valuable instruments and the theft or 
misappropriation of goods.  Article 3 of the UCC governs property right contests between an 
original owner of a lost or misappropriated instrument and a subsequent bona fide purchaser; and 
here the UCC uses proxies for ordinary care and per se rules to decide negligence.86   Sections 3-404 
                                                 
82 Justice Holmes famously predicted that repeated transactions would permit the evolution of negligence proxies: 
 
But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that the court is to go on leaving 
the standard to the jury forever?  Is it not manifest, on the contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole, as fair a 
tribunal as it is represented to be, the lesson that can be got from that source will be learned.  
 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 98 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963). 
83 See e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Pa. 1993).  
For discussion, see Abraham, supra note –at –.  
84 Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920); Abraham, supra note – at 1201. 
85 In addition to the example of commercial paper, negligence principles have also been applied to potentially preclude 
the owner of real property from reclaiming mineral rights under a misappropriated deed that was transferred to a good 
faith purchaser.  Hauck V. Crawford, 62 N.W. 2d 92 (S.D. 1953). 
 
86 The nemo dat principle applies to negotiable instruments as well.  Thus, as a general rule, neither a thief nor a good 
faith purchaser from the thief can acquire property rights superior to that of the original owner.  Article 3 of the UCC 
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and 3-405 consider the special problems raised by the so-called impostor or “fictitious payee” cases.  
Where an impostor induces the issuer (that is, the owner) of an instrument to issue it in the name of 
the impostor or in the name of a fictitious payee, the issuer is per se negligent and loses to a good 
faith “purchaser” (i.e., a person who takes the instrument for value), unless the good faith purchaser 
failed to exercise ordinary care in taking the instrument.87 Similarly, under §3-405, the “owner” of 
an instrument is per se negligent if a trusted employee forges an indorsement and transfers the 
instrument to a good faith purchaser for value who exercises ordinary care.88   Section 3-103(a)(9) of 
Article 3 defines ordinary care as the observance of prevailing commercial standards in the local 
area and further specifies a per se rule absolving banks that fail to examine the instrument prior to 
payment from negligence liability.89    
 
   Building on these solutions, we partition stolen and misappropriated goods into two 
categories: (i) “anonymous” goods and (ii) “identifiable” goods.   The original owner cannot prove 
that an anonymous good is hers even if she discovers a buyer in possession.  For example, a person 
may have had her GPS stolen and observed another person with the same GPS brand. The GPS may 
                                                                                                                                                                   
then provides several exceptions to the nemo dat principle.  In addition to the familiar rule that a thief of bearer paper 
can transfer good title to a holder (UCC § 3-201(b)), §§3-404, 3-405 and 3-406, specify exceptions to the theft rule that 
apply to instruments that require an indorsement by the owner to transfer title.  That these exceptions rely on negligence 
principles is perhaps less surprising once we recall that the principal drafter of Article 3 in the initial UCC project was 
William Prosser. For discussion of the negligence rules in Article 3, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and 
Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 Va. L. Rev. 181 (1996). 
 
87 UCC § 3-404(a),(d).  The 1990 revisions to Article 3 of the UCC adopt a comparative negligence rule in §3-404(d) 
(as well as in §§ 3-405(b) and 3-406(b)) in lieu of the pure contributory negligence principles that applied under the pre 
1990 Code.   While there are differences in terms of proportionate responsibility, the underlying incentive effects are 
similar.   
88 UCC §3-405(b) 
89 UCC §3-103(a)(9). See Bank of Texas v. VR Elec., Inc., 276 S.W. 3d 671 (Tex. App. 2008 (bank’s failure to have 
written policy regarding when checks should be manually examined was a failure to observe prevailing commercial 
standards in the area); and HSBC bank v. F&M Bank Northern Virginia, 246 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2001) (leaving one-half 
inch of open space following numerical portion of check and one inch of open space following its writ nindication of 
amount of check was not failure to observe prevailing commercial standards). 
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actually belong to the owner but she cannot prove it.90   Identifiable goods are in two categories: (a) 
Goods the owner can identify by their inherent nature, such as art by known artists, certain precious 
jewels and antiquities; and (b) goods that the owner can remove from the anonymous class, such as 
by tagging electronic equipment, registering automobiles and branding animals.91   
  
The probability that owners can find anonymous goods approaches zero.  Consequently, 
owners take optimal precautions against theft: an owner, that is, chooses the precaution level c*.92  
On the other hand, when owners do not search, buyers take no precautions.93  There apparently is no 
private law solution to this buyer inefficiency.   
 
 Our goal, regarding identifiable goods, is to make a negligence solution to the good faith 
purchase problem plausible.  The proxies we recommend below should be evaluated in this spirit.  
The combination of legislation and consequent litigation will determine which of these proxies, or 
others, will come to be legally efficacious.  Commercial law cannot develop effective proxies, 
however, unless it commits to a negligence solution.   
 
 1. Precautions against theft. 
   
Proxies for owner negligence fall in two categories.  First, as with negotiable instruments, 
owners should take customary precautions.  As examples, it could be negligence not to have a 
                                                 
90 Other examples include electronic equipment that is untagged, chopped up autos, melted silverware, and cut up 
diamonds. 
91 Whether goods are anonymous or identifiable may depend on when they are taken.  Thus, while an individual GPS 
may be anonymous, a carton of them would be identifiable if the merchant owner found the carton before it is broken 
up.  This suggests that the law should encourage prompt search. 
92 When x(z), the probability of recovering stolen goods, is zero the owner solves the same maximization problem that 
the social planner solves, so she invests efficiently in precaution.  Referring to Part II above, Expression (4) reduces to 
Expression (1). 
 
93 Formally, when x(z) = 0, the left-hand side of Expression (5) becomes zero: the marginal return from buyer inquiry 
vanishes so the buyer will not incur costs to check title.  Stepping outside the analysis, the purchaser may incur liability 
to public authorities if he violates criminal statutes against knowingly receiving stolen goods. 
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burglar alarm, not to have a good lock for doors, not to have a safe and to put valuables in it, not to 
have night lights, not to bar ground floor windows in certain neighborhoods, not to hire guards in 
museums, not to attempt to conceal valuable shipments or to hire guards for them, not to have an 
internal control system that permits inventory to be tracked, not to use security cameras, not to bolt 
mobile equipment to immobile structures and the like.94  More modern methods of deterring theft 
include systems that permit owners to disable lost goods from performing their functions or that can 
only be operated by their owners.   It may be negligence for owners not to use such goods if their use 
is otherwise cost justified. 
 
Second, goods that can be made identifiable in a cost-justified way should be made 
identifiable.  As an example, it could be negligence not to tag when tagging would be efficacious.  
Identification reduces the gain to theft or misappropriation by clogging channels for selling 
defectively titled goods and reducing the price buyers will pay for them.  Tagging is an evolving 
technology.  A recent Google search for “anti-theft tagging” revealed 989,000 entries in .27 seconds.  
Thus, a negligence law for stolen goods will evolve as technology evolves.   A contemporary 
illustration is instructive: The use of satellite technology now permits archeologists to identify 
thousands of valuable antiquities at their situs and thus monitor them for theft or damage.95   By 
                                                 
94  There are a number of proxies indicative of negligence in protecting artwork.  These include factors that occur on an 
owner’s premises, such as setting up a functioning alarm system, placing functioning security cameras in strategic 
locations, hiring guards, and placing glass protectors over paintings to preclude viewers from actually touching artwork 
in a museum.  They also include actions post-theft, such as reporting the loss to local police or domestic Interpol or 
customs officials, registering the stolen item with a country’s customs office and with organizations such as the Art Loss 
Register, a group based in New York that tracks lost or stolen works of art and employs private investigators to track it.  
See e.g., QMI Agency, “Charges in Van Gogh Heist,” The Toronto Sun, Sept. 7, 2010 (“Eleven officials from Egypt’s 
culture ministry have been charged with negligence” in the case of an August 2010 theft of a Van Gogh painting.  The 
charges were partially based on the fact that “only seven of the 43 security cameras in the [Mohamed Mahmoud Khalil 
Museum in Giza] were actually working.”); Kristen Chick, “The Thieves Had It Easy in Cairo Art Heist,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, Aug. 24, 2010 ( The negligence charges against the Egyptian officials were based on  separate failures 
of any security systems or procedures to operate effectively:  First, “[n]one of the alarms meant to protect the artwork in 
the museum sounded”; second, “[o]nly seven of 43 security cameras were working”; third, paintings lacked glass 
protectants and hung easily within reach of viewers; and finally, “guards were scarce enough that the thieves were able 
to drag a couch underneath the painting to stand on while cutting the $55 million painting from its frame in broad 
daylight.” Julian Radcliffe, founder of The Art Loss Register, which maintains a stolen art database, explained: 
“[P]roperly protecting artwork is no simple task.  It requires costly technological safeguards, such as burglar alarms and 
camera surveillance, and guards in every room.”). 
 
95 As one archeologist observed: “The classic rule in preservation is that you can’t preserve something until you know 
that you have it.” Timothy P. Whalen, quoted in Randy Kennedy, In History-Rich Region, a Very New System Tracks 
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employing this technology, the Getty Conservation Institute in Los Angeles has built a web based 
system that uses satellite images to identify antiquities in over 10,000 sites in Jordan.96  This system, 
once expanded to other countries, would be an effective tool both to deter looting and to aid in the 
search for stolen objects.      
 
2. Proxies for search. 
  
Our proposal creates an incentive for the non-negligent owner to search optimally.  Thus, 
there apparently is no need to evaluate how efficiently owners search.  Out of equilibrium behavior 
sometimes occurs, however.  For example, a nonprofit owner, such as a museum, may be dilatory. 
Thus, we would permit a buyer to raise the defense of negligence in owner search.   Proxies for such 
negligence thus are helpful.  Tagging or otherwise identifying goods facilitates search.  The 
corollary is that the failure so to identify goods reduces the incentive to search for them, and 
therefore should be regarded as a search inefficiency.   Second, search should be diligent and timely.  
The high profile art cases suggest that owners can find inherently identifiable goods, and prompt 
search may turn up goods that are in a transiently identifiable state.97  In the case of stolen art, search 
is aided by the growth of on-line art registries that that can track stolen or lost art.98   
 
The existence of proxies for reasonable search raises the question how a timely search, or its 
absence, can be shown.  A number of commentators have argued for an adverse possession rule for 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Very Old Things, New York Times, c1-2, August 25, 2010. 
 
96 Id. 
 
97  Examples of transiently identifiable goods include goods that are in an original, labeled package or have not had tags 
disabled. 
98  See e.g., “Canada Hot for Stolen Art,” The Toronto Star, Mar. 27, 2010 (Suggesting various options for owners of 
stolen artwork, including reporting theft to local Interpol office, or registering stolen item with country’s customs and 
with Art Loss Register, which employs private investigators to track and verify stolen art.), and Guillermo Contreras, 
“Painting Sold in S.A. Ruled to Be Stolen,” San Antonio Express-News, Jan. 15, 2010 (Citing U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and the Art Loss Register as critical players in returning stolen art from San Antonio to the 
French museum from which it was stolen in the 1980s. In this case the Art Loss Register in New York notified French 
authorities after the stolen painting was submitted to an auction.) 
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stolen personal property.99  Under this regime, the statute of limitations in replevin runs from the 
time of the first possession by a dealer or other good faith purchaser.100  This rule is easy to 
administer, but does not relate directly to the behavior the law should encourage.  The shift in a 
number of American states to a “discovery” rule for recovery of identifiable stolen goods is a 
preferable means of implementing a negligence regime.  Under such a regime, the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the owner “discovers or should have discovered” the goods.101  The 
courts’ discretion under this rule could be confined by verifiable proxies whose absence implies 
search negligence.  As examples, owners should report thefts of identifiable goods to the police, list 
stolen goods on computerized databases or otherwise advertise their loss, publicize searches, check 
sale catalogues of notable art and antiquities, and in some cases hire professional searchers.   
 
 
3. Proxies for buyer inquiry. 
  Under our proposal, the law need not evaluate the buyer’s behavior.  As argued above, the 
buyer should lose to a non-negligent owner regardless of the inquiry level the buyer chose.   
Moreover, we argue below that when both owner and buyer are negligent, the buyer should be 
                                                 
99 See e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 119 (1988); R.H. 
Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1221 (1986); Nicholas 
D. Ward, The Georgia Grind; Can the Common Law Accommodate the Problems of Title in the Art World, 
Observations on a Recent Case, 8 J.C. & U.L. 533 (1981-2); John P. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of 
Limitations, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 875 (1933). 
100 See e.g., Dragoo v. Cooper, 72 Ky. 9 (Bush) 629, 632 (1873)(“We perceive no valid reason why the rule of 
construction adopted in suits relating to realty shall not be applied in actions for the recovery of personalty.”); Dee v. 
Hyland, 3P.388,388 (Utah 1883); Hull v. Davidson, 25 S.W. 1047(Tex. Civ. App. 1894) (finding for buyer who had 
been “claiming and holding [a horse] notoriously and adversely.”); Gaillard v. Hudson, 8 S.E. 534, (Ga. 1889) 
(permitting buyer to tack prior purchasers period of possession); Burroughs Adding Machine Co. V. Bivens-Corhn, 119 
P. 2d 58,59 (holding that using a typewriter in plain view in a business was an “open and notorious possession”). 
 
101 See e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A. 2d 862 (N.J. 1980), and Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F. 2d (278) 7th Cir. 1990), cert 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992).  See also Property Law of the People’s Republic of China Art. 107; Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation Arts. 196, 200, and 234.  A growing number of American jurisdictions have adopted the “discovery” 
rule for triggering the statute of limitations in replevin. Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 
103 Yale L. J. 2437, 2444-51 (1994).   
 39
permitted to keep the goods.  As a consequence, the buyer prevails against a negligent owner 
regardless of the inquiry level he chose.  Thus, the law needs to create incentives only for owners.102 
  
If a state wishes to retain the distinction between the theft and voidable title cases, however, 
it should require the buyer to exercise due care in making a title inquiry (rather than the lower good 
faith standard).  A buyer makes an optimal investigation into his seller’s title when he invests w*. 
But again there is a verifiability problem: a court would have difficulty recovering w*.  As with the 
owner, this problem can be ameliorated by providing appropriate proxies for negligence.  We would 
define negligence by a buyer as buying from a non-standard source, or purchasing goods at a 
dramatic (more than two fold) discount from the current market price of similar goods,103 or ignoring 
                                                 
102 Although our proposal effectively imposes a strict liability standard on buyers if owners take efficient precautions, 
the  steps buyers do take to discover whether artwork has been lost or stolen are a useful indicator of  the resources an 
owner can access in reporting a theft or loss.  In addition, current buyer actions suggest that buyers could respond to the 
incentives a strict liability regime creates for them.  Regarding those actions, there is substantial evidence that buyers of 
valuable art and artifacts check the Art Loss Register and Interpol reports to see if a particular item has been reported as 
lost or stolen.  These actions illustrate the efficacy of owners’ attempts to protect their property and thus support the 
feasibility of implementing a negligence standard for owners.  In addition, the common search strategies employed by 
professional buyers is evidence of relevant professional standards of care, at least for collectors/gallery owners. For 
example, in 1986, the International Council of Museums adopted a code of professional ethics that insists on due 
diligence for every item entering a collection.  Elisabetta Povoledo, “Returning Stolen Art:  No Easy Answers,” NY 
Times, Oct. 27, 2007.  Since galleries and museums  are the major players in the art world on the buy side,  their 
standards of care support holding owners to similar standards of diligence in reporting theft or loss.  For discussion see  
The Associated Press, “New York City:  Stolen Moore Sculpture Recovered in Toronto,” Newsday, Mar. 26, 2010 
(Highlighting that gallery owner of gallery housing stolen sculpture had searched the Art Loss Register database to see if 
it had been reported stolen, because “[w]hen a piece doesn’t have any history, anything that is verifiable, you need to do 
due diligence.”); Elisabetta Povoledo, “Returning Stolen Art:  No Easy Answers,” NY Times, Oct. 27, 2007 ( Reporting 
that The Museum of Fine Art in Boston returned 13 archaeological artifacts to Italy, and citing museum codes and 
guidelines drafted in the spirit of a 1970 Unesco convention prohibiting illicit circulation of a nation’s cultural 
property.); Patricia C. Johnson, “ Museums Struggle to Make Sure They’re Not Receiving Stolen Goods,” The Houston 
Chronicle, July 16, 2006 (Discussing fact that “‘[i]n today’s environment, the collector needs to exercise due 
diligence,’” meaning that buyers must research in depth the origin or source of particular artwork, including “where, 
when and by who[m] it was made; if it was exhibited or documented in a book or catalogue; when and where it was sold 
or disappeared….It’s the job of the collector, whether private or public, to evaluate the record” before procuring the item 
to ensure the collector will actually have good title.”); David Bonetti, “A Mystery Behind Art Museum’s Mummy 
Mask?,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 20, 2006 (Reporting that a former art forger and smuggler accused the St. Louis 
Art Museum of purchasing and displaying a stolen Egyptian mummy.  In defending itself, the Museum declared that it 
had done “due diligence” in purchasing the artifact, including contacting both Interpol and the Art Loss Register,) 
 
103 When a market exhibits price dispersion, purchase at a price that is more than one standard deviation below the 
mean would be in bad faith.  Such a price is likely to be below the cost of reputable dealers. 
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a tag or other standard method of identification.  These verifiable proxies should improve the 
functioning of a voidable title rule. 
 
C. Property Rules When Neither Party Is Negligent or Both Are. 
 
 Our negligence regime apparently does not cover cases when neither party is negligent or 
when both are.  Here the law must allocate property rights between the parties. We argue that the 
owner should prevail as between two non-negligent parties for two reasons.  First, the contrary rule – 
the buyer wins – is inefficient.  To be sure, the owner’s incentive to take precautions would be 
unaffected by a switch to the contrary rule.  Under either rule, the owner loses unless she takes 
optimal care so she will take optimal care.  However, the non-negligent owner’s incentive to search 
for lost goods under the contrary rule would be reduced because she could not recover the goods if 
the buyer behaved non-negligently.  The buyer’s incentive to take care would also be reduced 
because his return from inquiry falls as his probability of being found falls.  Hence, letting the buyer 
prevail when neither party is negligent creates three inefficiencies: (i) the owner’s incentive to 
search is reduced; (ii) the buyer’s incentive to inquire into title is weakened even further; and (iii) 
because the owner searches less, the probability that the parties will bargain to permit the highest 
valuing party to own the goods falls.  In contrast, if the owner prevails when neither party is 
negligent, the owner has first best incentives and the buyer’s inefficiency is unchanged.  Thus, 
efficiency considerations argue for permitting the owner to prevail whenever she takes optimal 
precautions to prevent theft.104     
  
Second, letting the owner prevail also follows from the premise that private law rules should 
not redistribute entitlements unless good instrumental reasons exist for doing so.  We assumed above 
and argue below that owner negligence is a sufficient reason to cut off an owner’s property right.  
                                                 
104 This argument shows that our analysis actually covers the case when neither party is negligent.  Courts and 
commentators sometimes express sympathy for buyers who may be dispossessed though they apparently purchased in 
good faith.  We offer two comments by way of rebuttal.  First, buyers keep anonymous goods because owners do not 
search for them.  A buyer will not lose a sweater or a stereo.  Second, buyers can repurchase goods from owners who 
find them.  Hence, a buyer would be dispossessed only when the owner values the goods more highly than he does.  
This suggests that the owner who never finds the goods is the more sympathetic party. 
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Encouraging the free flow of commerce is a second and often asserted reason to cut off the owner’s 
rights.105  The social goal, however, should not be to encourage buyers to purchase goods 
simpliciter, but to encourage non-negligent buyers to purchase goods.  Letting the buyer prevail 
when neither party is negligent would partly defeat this goal.  And since there are no instrumental 
reasons to prefer innocent buyers to innocent owners, the premise that redistribution is a public law 
function should control. 
 
 In contrast, the law should protect the buyer when both parties are negligent.  Our goal here 
is to minimize the disruption that involuntary dispossessions can cause.  When the owner locates the 
goods, she has already been disrupted by theft or misappropriation.  Alternatively, she has not been 
disrupted at all because she had delivered the goods under a transaction of purchase and so expected 
not to get them back.106  Therefore, the owner’s disruption costs are sunk (or never existed) when the 
law must make an allocation decision; and the owner has accommodated as well as she could to her 
loss.  In contrast, the buyer has adjusted to owning the goods, not to losing them.  Imposing the loss 
on the owner thus punishes her negligent behavior but does not further injure her.  Imposing the loss 
on the buyer would punish his negligent behavior, but it also would create a new injury.  In this 
context, one negligent party necessarily must be punished, but both parties need not be disrupted.   
Thus, a negligent buyer should be permitted to keep the goods when the owner also is negligent.107 
 We summarize this reasoning in Proposition Five: 
                                                 
105 See SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 10 at 461-62 (“Metaphors of free flowing commerce or unclogged channels of 
trade do not illuminate [the good faith purchase] issue.”) 
106 In this case, the owner’s immediate transferee cannot respond in damages so she asserts an in rem claim to the 
goods in the hands of the third party. 
 
107 A virtue of this result is that there is no need for courts to evaluate buyer behavior: buyers always lose when owners 
are not negligent; and buyers always win when owners are negligent.  An objection to letting negligent buyers prevail is 
that buyers would behave strategically by seeking out negligent owners from whom to purchase.  This objection seems 
implausible.  Owners behave optimally in equilibrium.  In practice, this means that many owners behave well, so that 
buyers would have to search extensively to find negligent potential sellers.  Also, whether an owner invested efficiently 
in precautions may not be conveniently observable to an outsider.  The costs to buyer search for negligent owners thus 
probably exceed the gain.  Also, permitting “passively” negligent buyers to prevail but barring “actively” negligent 
buyers creates another litigation issue.  A negligent owner would have an incentive to litigate the category of buyer 
negligence.  The social gain from so expanding good faith litigations seems too slight to justify the expansion. 
 
 42
When neither party is negligent, efficiency is enhanced by a property rule that allocates the right to 
recover stolen or misappropriated goods to the original owner.  When both parties are negligent, 
the goal of minimizing disruption costs supports allocating the property right to keep stolen or 
misappropriated goods to the buyer. 
 
      
D.  Barriers to Enactment:  Transition Costs and the Political Economy of Sales Law 
 
The verifiable negligence rule we propose raises law revision concerns.  Putting political 
economy issues aside for the moment, good faith purchase laws are relatively simple to revise.  
These laws are governed in the United States and elsewhere largely by statute.  Thus, for example, 
UCC §2-403 can be readily amended to incorporate negligence principles as well as to specify 
appropriate proxies for negligence.  The significant drafting issue is whether the Code should 
specify bright line proxies for ordinary care in the form of per se statutory rules, provide courts a 
choice of proxies by putting illustrations of behaviors that constitute reasonable precautions in the 
Code comments, or use both methods.  The solution should turn on the answer to an empirical 
question: how heterogeneous are the ways in which owners can take optimal precautions?  Our 
tentative view is that the circumstances surrounding theft or misappropriation of goods are no more 
heterogeneous than those that accompany theft or misappropriation of commercial paper.  Thus, we 
support a relatively precise statutory definition of negligent (or non-negligent) behavior modeled on 
the Article 3 treatment of verifiable negligence.  This approach will give parties some guidance yet 
permit common law development. 
 
  There is a difficult question whether interest group opposition would block enactment of a 
verifiable negligence rule, either domestically or in foreign jurisdictions.  We have previously 
argued that interest group competition among participants in private legislative processes such as the 
processes that determine UCC and Restatement content generate a strong status quo bias; powerful 
private actors can cause these “private legislatures” often to reject significant reform.108  Our goal in 
                                                 
108 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995).  
One of us has applied the insights from this model to the products of the groups formulating international rules 
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this paper is to develop solutions to the good faith purchase problem that a well-motivated decision 
maker would adopt.  Hence, identifying politically effective strategies for overcoming interest group 
opposition to such solutions is beyond our scope.  We will, however, note some of the apparent 
difficulties. 
 
  Original owners and ultimate buyers are numerous and widely scattered and so neither group 
could constitute an effective political force.  In contrast, dealers and museums that both sell and buy 
already are organized in associations; these groups could participate relatively conveniently in 
legislative considerations.  Our solution imposes additional duties on dealers and on museums in 
their capacity as sellers: to behave non-negligently and to search promptly. We also advocate a 
version of punitive damages for dealers: the tort fine.109   Museums and dealers thus would face 
higher costs of doing business, and would also incur transition costs: to retrain personnel; to 
renegotiate relationships with intermediaries; to generate working groups and best practice 
statements.  Turning to the international arena, dealers in Market Overt regimes collect premiums 
because they can convert bad titles into good ones. These premiums are industry-specific and thus 
not likely to be competed away.110    
 
  Assessing the severity of the political economy barriers to enactment is difficult as an a priori 
matter.   As examples, increasing the costs of current dealers may increase the barriers to entry into 
the dealer market.  In deciding whether to oppose our reform, dealers thus would have to trade off 
the gain from strengthened market power against reform costs.111  Museums are nonprofits who 
often receive public subsidies, and so museums may be sensitive to good will losses from being 
                                                                                                                                                                   
governing the sale of goods.  See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales 
Law, 25 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 446 (2005).  For a similar analysis of the products of such international treaties, see Paul 
B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 Va J.Int’l. L. 743 
(1999).  
 
109 See text accompanying notes 69 –73 infra. 
 
110 We are grateful to Paul Stephan for this point. 
 
111 There is an analogy to the cigarette companies, who did not oppose bans on advertising in many popular media.  The 
companies’ increased cost of reaching buyers were outweighed by the ban-created barrier to the entry of new 
competitors. 
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perceived to oppose theft deterring reform.  These considerations suggest that our reforms are not 
obviously infeasible politically, and so at this early stage should be considered on their merits.  
Further, in jurisdictions in which the primary negligence rule cannot be enacted, emphasis should 
shift from the substantive to the procedural; that is, from primary negligence to the relevant statutes 
of limitations.  In the art market, at least, thieves expect that merchandise will chill over time.112 
This makes the statutes of limitations critically important.  The New Jersey “discovery” rule, which 
declines to toll the statute for negligent owners, captures many of the benefits of our proposal.113 
Moreover, dealer resistance might be easier to overcome if legal change were tied to reform of the 
statute of limitations rather than to a replacement of Market Overt with a negligence regime. 
 
IV. MORAL OBJECTIONS TO A NEGLIGENCE RULE 
 
We now consider two moral concerns that our negligence solution to the good faith purchase 
problem may raise.  First, are the justifications for protecting property strong enough to overcome 
the efficiency case for barring a negligent owner from recovering her goods?  Moral theorists adduce 
three reasons for protecting the property rights of original owners:  (a) an owner has a special or 
particular relationship to property;114 (b) protecting property assists directly in protecting liberty or 
personhood;115 or (c) the possibility of owning property creates an incentive to create wealth which, 
in turn, enhances personal autonomy.116  None of these considerations should defeat a negligence 
solution to the good faith purchase rules governing voidable title and entrustment.   In the voidable 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
112 ULRICH BOSER, THE GARDNER HEIST:  THE TRUE STORY OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST UNSOLVED ART THEFT (2009). 
 
113 See e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A. 2d 862 (N.J. 1980), and text accompanying notes 98-99 infra. 
 
114 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 256 (1958) ( asserting that “private property is a vital need for the 
soul…all men have an invincible inclination to appropriate to their own minds anything which over a long, uninterrupted 
period they have used for their work, pleasure or the necessities of life.”). 
 
115 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II, CH. V (1690) (PETER LASLETT ED. 1988) (“Though the 
earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person.”); Charles A. 
Reich, The New Property,73 Yale L. J. 733, 771 (1964) (arguing that property “performs the function of maintaining 
independence, dignity and pluralism.”);  cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood 34 Stan L. Rev. 957 (1982).  
 
116 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
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title case, the owner transfers the goods with the expectation that the transferee will sell them and 
thereafter remit a portion of the price to the owner.  A consignment sale is a common illustration of 
this behavior.117  Property right considerations do not apply to the voidable title case because the 
owner’s loss is pecuniary.  She has voluntarily parted with goods in exchange for the promise of 
money, but has not been paid.  She seeks the goods because her initial transferee is judgment proof 
and a claim to goods may be easier to enforce against relatively innocent third parties than a claim 
for money.  In the entrustment case, the owner expects to get the goods back.  A common illustration 
of this case is where the entrustee sells goods he was supposed to repair and return.  There also 
cannot be a property right objection to a negligence rule in the entrustment case because such a rule 
provides even greater protection to the owner than does the current United States law; under a 
negligence rule, the owner prevails even over a buyer in the ordinary course of business if she makes 
a non-negligent choice of transferee. 
  
 A negligence rule, however, does materially weaken the owner’s property right in the theft 
case because it grants the property right to buyers when an owner is negligent.  But the case for 
vindicating the original owner’s property rights in the theft case is weak.  Justifications based on 
property as liberty or as personhood are strongly over-inclusive in the good faith purchase context.  
Business firms that are fictional persons lacking moral identities are nevertheless permitted to 
recover stolen property.118  In the same vein, individuals have the same right to recover LCD TVs 
that have no unique personhood properties as they do engagement rings that do.  A more nuanced 
rule that sought to accommodate liberty and personhood values might use a negligence regime with 
carve outs for particular classes of property interests.  We are doubtful that the administrative costs 
of such a rule are justified, however, especially where an owner’s rights are cut off under a 
negligence rule only if she materially contributed to her own loss.  Finally, the wealth-creating 
                                                 
117 Under UCC §2-403(1), an owner’s voluntary transfer enables her transferee to convey good title to a good faith 
purchaser if the “goods have been delivered [to the transferee] under a transaction of purchase.” See also §2-326 (the 
consignor loses to a good faith purchaser).  
 
118 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541, 556 
(2003) (arguing that business firms are artificial persons whose autonomy the state need not respect on moral grounds 
and whose morality is ordinarily required by positive law). 
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justification for protecting the original owner’s property interest fails as well.  Granting such rights 
to a negligent owner may actually reduce wealth, by encouraging theft.  A negligence rule, on the 
other hand, creates incentives to protect wealth. 
 
 The second moral concern challenges the instrumental justification for eliminating the 
distinction between the void and voidable title cases.  Under a verifiable negligence rule, the owner 
prevails in both cases if she is not negligent; under current United States law, the owner only 
prevails in the void title case (there is theft) but loses in the voidable title case.119   A possible 
justification for retaining current law may follow from the act/omission distinction.  Under this 
distinction, actions are more blameworthy than omissions.  An owner acts when she transfers goods 
to a transferee but only omits precautions when she is negligent.120 The act/omission distinction is an 
application of the doctrine of “double effect.”  This doctrine, commonly applied in noncommercial 
contexts, distinguishes between consequences of actions that were intended, as ends or as means, 
and consequences that were only foreseen.121  On this view, intentionally killing a person is more 
blameworthy than failing to take an action that would prevent the death of a person.  In the former 
case, the actor intended to cause a death; in the latter case, the actor did not, though he could foresee 
that his failure to act would result in death.122  As applied here, in the voidable title cases the owner 
intends to part with her property as the means to maximize her utility.  In the void title cases, the 
owner could merely foresee that her failure to take appropriate precautions would result in the loss 
of her property and in harm to good faith buyers if she successfully recovers the property.  But here 
the owner did not intend to incur a loss or to harm others. 
 
                                                 
119 The void/voidable title distinction seems to have become part of U.S. law in consequence of a poorly thought out 
borrowing from the English common law.  Other countries also make the distinction, however.  See Appendix, infra. 
120 Some cases apparently apply this distinction.  In West v. Roberts, 143 P.2d 1037 (Colo. 2006), the court 
distinguished the voidable from the void title cases because in the former the owner made a voluntary transfer of his 
property.  
121 Alison McIntyre, "Doctrine of Double Effect", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed. 
2009), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/double-effect/>. 
 
122 Id. 
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 Our verifiable negligence solution collapses the distinction between the void and voidable 
title cases partly because we reject the doctrine of double effect.123  This doctrine confuses two 
questions.  The first is whether an act is morally permissible.  The second is whether an agent acted 
in a morally permissible way when she did the act.  The former question must be answered by 
weighing the considerations for and against the act; the latter question requires an assessment of the 
agent’s motives.  To illustrate, a person may give money to a charity from base motives, such as a 
desire for recognition or to spite relatives who wished to inherit her estate.  If the money will be well 
spent, however, the giving of it is morally praiseworthy even though the giver is not.  Similarly, a 
person may drive too quickly in order to visit a sick friend, and her speeding may injure another.  
Here the person committed a blameworthy act, though she intended to do good, not harm.   
 
 Law reform should focus on acts, not motives.  Applying this distinction here, an owner who 
fails to take effective precautions against theft encourages the theft and may cause harm to later 
purchasers.  Her failure thus is culpable even though she probably did not intend harm to anyone.  
Losing her property is an appropriate sanction.  In the same vein, an owner who voluntarily transfers 
property after making the right inquiries has acted in a blameless fashion, whatever her intent may 
have been.  There thus seems no morally compelling reason to distinguish between the victim of 
theft and the victim of misappropriation.  And to summarize, there apparently is no moral objection 
to applying a negligence standard to owners generally, thereby permitting only non-negligent 
owners to recover goods that either were stolen or misappropriated.  
 
 
 
 
V. GOOD FAITH PURCHASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
A.  Harmonizing Good Faith Purchase Laws. 
 
                                                 
123 The following discussion owes much to THOMAS SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, Ch. I  (2009). 
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 In this part, we consider how the laws of various jurisdictions would change in light of our 
analysis, and we also look at the costs of retaining the status quo.124  The initial issue is simple, in a 
sense: no jurisdiction has adopted our modified negligence solution, so our proposal would change 
the law everywhere.  It may be helpful to be somewhat more concrete.  In Parts III and IV, we show 
how United States law would change.  Canada, England, India, and Russia also allow original 
owners to prevail in the theft case, so our solution would reduce the owner’s rights but increase her 
incentive to take precautions in those jurisdictions as well.125 
  
Brazil, France, Japan, Mexico and Switzerland vary the theft rule:  The owner prevails 
against an ultimate buyer in good faith only if she reimburses the price the buyer paid.126  Under the 
reimbursement version of the theft rule, the owner’s incentive to take precautions against theft 
increases because she no longer recovers the goods but rather recovers the goods less the cost of 
purchasing them a second time.  For the same reason, the owner searches suboptimally for stolen 
goods.  The buyer’s incentive to inquire into title also is reduced under the reimbursement version of 
the theft rule because the buyer is more likely to keep the goods.  These effects are similar to those 
that the voidable title rule produces (see Proposition Two above), but the reimbursement rule 
actually is less efficient than the voidable title rule for two reasons.  First, the buyer’s suboptimal 
incentive to inquire, because the owner may not find him, is further reduced because the law now 
insures the buyer’s purchase price.  Second, the reimbursement version of the search rule dampens 
owner search more severely than does the voidable title rule. 
 
                                                 
124 Reasons for the lack of uniformity in good faith purchase laws are discussed in Saul Levmore, Variety and 
Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good Faith Purchaser, 16 J. Legal Stud. 43 (1987). 
 
125  See Appendix, infra. In England, Canada (Ontario) and India the owner cannot recover under the theft rule if the 
owner’s conduct precludes him from denying the seller’s authority to sell.  However, mere negligence by the owner in 
failing to take precautions against theft does not constitute grounds for invoking an estoppel. See English Sale of Goods 
Act § 21; Ontario Sale of Goods Act § 22; Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 § 27.  As indicated in the Introduction, these 
jurisdictions create a legal origin problem for buyers because two legal rules can apply to the same goods.  Our unitary 
reform proposal would eliminate this additional inefficiency.  In Germany and Mexico, the theft rule applies in part: The 
owner loses to a good faith purchaser who bought at a public auction. See e.g., The Civil Code (BGB), Section 935; 
Mexico Civil Code, Art. 799.      
 
126 See Appendix infra. 
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 To understand the second effect, realize that the owner’s value for found goods and the price 
at which the buyer purchased those goods are positively correlated.  Correlation exists because the 
owner and buyer usually have similar uses for the goods and so purchased in similar markets.  Under 
the voidable title rule, correlation does not matter because the owner does not pay the buyer’s price; 
she searches when her expected value exceeds search costs.  Under the reimbursement version of the 
theft rule, however, the owner must predict the price at which the buyer purchased because she will 
search only if her expected value less the buyer’s price exceeds search costs.  Correlation between 
the owner’s value and the buyer’s predicted price likely is substantial for commercial goods with 
relatively unitary uses, such as machines and trucks.  Then search costs may cut off owner pursuit 
altogether.127  This is ex ante inefficient because it much reduces the buyer’s incentive to inquire, 
and it is ex post inefficient because it precludes the possibility of an ex post bargain under which the 
goods would end up in the hands of the highest valuing user.  The pure theft rule and the voidable 
title rule thus are preferable on efficiency grounds to the reimbursement version of the theft rule.128 
  
Many countries adopt the voidable title rule, and a majority of these adopt the entrusting 
rule.129  A number of countries adopt Market Overt.130  China adopts a reimbursement version of the 
                                                 
127 Denoting the price of found goods as q(t3), two inequalities may hold: (a) x(zvt)vr > z; (b) x(zrb)[vr – q(t3)] < z .  The 
left hand side of (a) is the expected value of searching for goods under the voidable title rule (finding probability times 
value); the right hand side is search costs.  The left hand side of (b) is the expected value of searching for goods under 
the reimbursement version of the theft rule.  The first term is the (lower) probability that the owner finds the goods under 
this rule; the term in brackets is the owner’s net gain from recovery.  As is apparent from (b), as the current price 
approaches the buyer’s current value, search costs are more likely to preclude owner pursuit. 
 
128 Spain adopts the reimbursement version of the theft rule for goods bought at a public sale and China adopts the 
version for goods bought at auction or at a public market. See Appendix infra. 
 
129 For voidable title, see the Czech Republic, England, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia and Switzerland.  
Countries that adopt the entrustment rule include England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Switzerland.  See 
Appendix, infra.  
 
130  Italy has the most buyer friendly version of the Market Overt rule.  The Italian Civil Code (Codice Civil) § 1153 
provides:  “He to whom movable goods are alienated by one who is not their owner, acquires their ownership by way of 
possession, provided he is in good faith (Article 1147) at the time of the delivery.”  Article 1599 also provides that 
“ownership is acquired free of rights of another in the thing if they do not appear in the instrument or transaction and the 
acquirer is in good faith.”  Other countries with a pure Market Overt rule include Israel and Germany (public auction 
only).  Brazil, China, France, Japan, Mexico, Spain and Switzerland have the reimbursement version of the Market 
Overt rule under which the owner can reclaim his property from the good faith purchaser if he reimburses him for his 
original purchase price.  See Appendix, infra. 
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voidable title rule and Brazil, China, France, Japan, Spain and Switzerland adopt the reimbursement 
version for Market Overt.  The reasoning above suggests that these versions are less efficient than 
the rules for which they substitute.  On the other hand, a number of jurisdictions have statutes of 
limitation that run from the time of theft rather than the time of discovery.  These limitation periods 
run from one to five years.131  Shorter limitation periods encourage search, which is efficient. 
 
To summarize, no advanced country has an efficient law of good faith purchase.  This defect 
has two causes.  First, efficiency is precluded under the property right paradigm, which countries 
have yet to escape.  Second, inchoate fairness notions appear to influence the rules.  Thus, it may 
seem unfair to require an innocent buyer to yield goods without reimbursing the price the buyer 
paid.  It also may seem unfair, however, to require an innocent original owner to pay for stolen 
goods twice.  Fairness notions seem indeterminate in the good faith purchase context.  Inefficient 
good faith purchase laws also create two categories of cost: first, the cost to a county of having an 
inefficient law; second, the costs to parties in all countries of coping with diverse inefficient laws.  
Our proposed reform thus has two virtues: it would improve the private incentives of parties affected 
by the law everywhere and, if adopted everywhere, it would eliminate the costs of diversity.  We 
next focus more directly on diversity costs. 
 
B.  The Costs of Disparity in Good Faith Purchase Law 
     
 The laws of many advanced commercial nations protect most buyers against the claims of 
non-negligent owners of stolen goods.  A consequence of these laws is to create potential havens for 
laundering valuable stolen goods, especially art and antiquities.132 Owners respond to this possibility 
by attempting to sue buyers in jurisdictions whose law, in the instant case, favors the owners.     
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
131 Some illustrations of short limitation periods include: Canada -- one year; China and Japan – two years; France, 
Mexico,  and Spain -- three years:; Switzerland -- five years. See Appendix infra. 
 
132 For discussion of the trafficking in stolen art and the problem of safe haven jurisdictions, see Harriet Crawley, 
Forget the Video, It’s Your Paintings They’re After, Daily Telegraph (London) June 16, 1992 at 16; Stanley Meisler, 
Art & Avarice, L.A. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, Magazine at 11; Don L. Boroughs et al, The Hidden Art of Theft, U.S. 
News & World Rep., Apr. 2, 1990 at 13 (noting Japan’s laws protecting the bona fide purchaser); James Walsh, It’s a 
Steal, Time, Nov. 25, 1991 at 87 (commenting on laws of Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Cayman Islands). 
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The resultant conflict of laws issues are complex.  In multi-jurisdictional contests, these issues turn 
on the interaction between the remedy the original owner uses to seek recovery of the goods 
(typically under United States law through an action in replevin) and the claims of the buyer that 
may trump the owner’s title.  The buyer’s claim may be substantive, as in the case where the buyer 
claims rights to the good based on his purchase from a merchant seller, or it may be procedural, as 
when the buyer asserts the bar of a statute of limitations.  Absent choice of law considerations, an 
owner seeking to recover stolen goods through a replevin action will be motivated to bring suit in a 
jurisdiction such as the United States that does not recognize the Market Overt exception to the 
nemo dat rule, as well as in a state, such as New York, that retains the “demand and refusal” rule for 
triggering the statute of limitations.133  To do so, the owner need only acquire in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendant buyer in New York.  Unfortunately for the owner, if the goods have 
been physically moved to (or from) other jurisdictions, the application of standard choice of law 
principles may well cause the forum of choice to decline to follow its own rule.  
 
 The uncertain effect of the interaction of disparate rules governing good faith purchase and 
the application of standard choice of law principles is well illustrated by the recent case of 
Gemological Institute of America, Inc. v. Zarian Co., Ltd, et al.134 Zarian claimed ownership rights 
to a $375,000 diamond that had been stolen from its business in Dubai and subsequently sold to 
Siyance Brothers Diamond Corp. (“Siyance”).  Siyance claimed that a member of its family business 
had purchased the diamond in Israel from a merchant dealer and then had transferred the diamond to 
its business in New York where it was brought to the Gemological Institute for grading.  The case 
turned on the choice of law between New York and Israel as to the title to stolen goods: New York 
law applies the theft rule favoring the original owner135 and Israel applies a Market Overt rule 
                                                 
133 Recall that under the demand and refusal rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the owner finds 
the stolen goods in the possession of the buyer, demands their return and the buyer refuses to return them.  See TAN 
infra. 
134 2006 WL 2239594 (S.D.N.Y.). 
 
135 Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Eliicofon, 536 F.Supp. 829, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Candela v. Port Motors Inc., 
617 N.Y.S. 2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1994).  
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favoring a good faith buyer from a merchant dealer who takes possession.136  The District Court 
applied the well-recognized choice of law rule that the validity of a transfer of personal property is 
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the property was located when it was transferred.137  
Unfortunately for the parties (and the court), the diamond trade relies on trust among members of a 
homogeneous community, and is marked by handshakes, relational contracting and a notable 
absence of documentation.138  Thus, the evidence failed clearly to indicate whether the transfer of 
the diamond to Siyance occurred in Israel or New York.   The court resolved this conundrum by 
holding for Zarian, the original owner, on the ground that even if Israeli sales law applied to the 
transaction, Siyance could not carry its burden of good faith given the absence of documentation, 
although such informal trades are common in the diamond industry.   
 
 It is difficult to rationalize the holding in Zarian on its own terms.  There was no evidence of 
bad faith by Siyance.  All of the testimony supported the claim by Siyance that a sale and transfer of 
                                                 
136 Section 34 of Israeli Sales Law states: 
 
Where any movable property is sold by a person who carries on the sale of property of the kind of the thing 
sold, and the sale is made in the ordinary course of his business, ownership passes to the buyer free of every 
charge, attachment or other right in the thing sold even if the seller is not the owner thereof or is not entitled to 
transfer it as aforesaid, provided that the buyer buys and takes possession of it in good faith.   
 
For discussion of Market Overt in Israel, see Eyal Zamir, Market Overt in the Sale of Goods: Israeli Law in a 
Comparative Perspective, 24 Israeli L. Rev. V83 (1990).  See also Shlomo Shetah v. Leon Bilder, District Court of Tel 
Aviv, C.A.582/89 (1991). 
 
137 2006 WL 2239594 at 2; Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., 2001 WL 1657237 (N.Y. Sup. 
2001); Greek Orthodox Patricarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s Inc., 199 WL 673347 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  In 
applying the law of the jurisdiction where the property was located at the time of the transfer, the New York court in  
Gemological Institute was following the widely- recognized lex locus situs rule of private international law. This rule 
focuses on the law of the transaction that led to the possession of the goods by the buyer, a transfer which typically 
involves, as we have seen, a sale from a dealer to a bona fide purchaser.  The lex locus situs rule thus neglects the 
issues surrounding the rights of the original owner, issues that are relevant in common law jurisdictions that retain the 
theft, voidable title and entrustment rules.  In this way, the lex locus situs rule facilitates the laundering of stolen goods 
by protecting transfers from intermediaries to good faith purchasers in jurisdictions that follow Market Overt. For 
discussion see Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., [1980] 1 All E.R. 1121, 1126 and Robin Morris Collin, 
The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 How. L. J. 17, 22-25 (1993). 
138 For discussion of relational contracting in the diamond trade and its global implications, see Barak D. Richman, 
Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms:  Toward a Positive Theory of Private Contracting, 104 Colum L. Rev. 
2328 (2004); and Barak Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalization:  Peering into the 
Diamond Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE:  EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL 
DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 31-49 (2009). 
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possession occurred in Israel.139  Testimony of the merchant dealer who sold the diamond to 
Siyance’s representative in Israel affirmed the custom in the trade of exchanging diamonds with a 
simple note, a petek that is destroyed once the price is paid.140 The dealer’s bona fides were 
confirmed by his status as a Vice President of the Israeli Precious Stones and Diamonds 
Exchange.141  Lacking any evidence of bad faith, therefore, the only remaining inference is that the 
New York court determined to preserve the rights of the original owner, which would have been 
available to him had the American theft rule applied.   
 
Zarian shows that problems do not stem from the choice of law rules themselves.  The lex 
locus situs choice of law rule applied by the court is facially neutral regarding the substantive rights 
of owners and buyers and as between demand and refusal and discovery statutes of limitation.   In 
effect, however, the governing choice of law rules facilitate the multi-billion dollar trafficking in 
stolen art, artifacts and antiquities by permitting wrongdoers to arbitrage between jurisdictions  with 
different statutes of limitations and between jurisdictions that follow the theft rule and those that 
recognize Market Overt.  Predictability in contests between owners and buyers thus requires a 
harmonization of both the substantive and procedural laws governing good faith purchase.  A 
uniform approach to good faith purchase would (i) reduce the demand for stolen goods; (ii) dampen 
socially wasteful efforts to launder those goods prior to their sale to innocent purchasers; and (iii) 
minimize wasteful conflict of laws litigation over which jurisdictions’ substantive and procedural 
rules govern, thereby reducing the incentives for forum shopping and wasteful litigation.    
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Laws addressing the good faith purchase problem have been around for millennia, but as yet 
there is no consensus, either among jurisdictions or among commentators, regarding an appropriate 
solution.  Discord exists because the problem is unsolvable within the regnant property rights 
paradigm.  The law acts by assigning property rights to one or the other of the parties: the owner 
                                                 
139 2006 WL 2239594 at 4. 
 
140 Id. 
 
141 Id. at 2. 
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always, sometimes, or never can recover her goods from the ultimate purchaser; and the purchaser 
always, sometimes, or never can keep them.  Property right solutions fail for two reasons.  First, the 
owner will not take efficient precautions against theft or misappropriation unless she loses stolen or 
misappropriated goods, while the buyer will not take efficient precautions against buying tainted 
goods unless he loses them to the owner.  Neither party can be given the property right always to 
lose or to keep the goods at issue.  Second, the owner cannot be given incentives to search for stolen 
or misappropriated goods unless she recovers them when found; but if she recovers them when 
found, her incentive to protect against theft falls.   
  
When a problem has no obvious solution, contingent factors and fairness concerns affect 
results.   As examples, the United States distinction between the cases of stolen and misappropriated 
goods probably results from an ineffective borrowing from English law in the early nineteenth 
century.142  The inefficient rule in some countries that an owner can recover her goods from a good 
faith purchaser only if the owner reimburses the price the purchaser paid probably stems from an 
effort to treat the owner and buyer even handedly.  Scholarly disagreement also stems partly from an 
inability strongly to defend any property rights allocation. 
 
Our contribution here is to argue for abandoning the property rights paradigm in favor of a 
tort paradigm.  Under our solution, an owner loses the goods if she invests a suboptimal level of care 
in precaution or searches suboptimally for goods.  A buyer always loses the goods to a non-negligent 
owner and always keeps them against a negligent owner.  The combination of negligence for owners 
and strict liability for buyers improves the parties’ incentives to protect against theft, to search for 
stolen or misappropriated goods, and to investigate title.  Our solution, however, may founder over 
the difficulty courts may have in evaluating the parties’ behavior.  Many of the facts relevant to a 
negligence rule are hard for courts to recover. 
  
We attempt to cope with this concern by translating to the good faith purchase context a 
solution pursued in negotiable instruments law: to use verifiable proxies that correlate with the 
existence or absence of negligent behavior.  We argue that some such proxies exist today, and that 
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more would emerge were the law committed to a negligence solution.  Thus, abandoning 
commercial law for tort in the good faith purchase context is a promising next step. 
 
We also make a comparative law analysis of good faith purchase rules.  This analysis shows 
two things: the law is inefficient everywhere, though in different ways; and the law’s inefficiency 
causes socially unnecessary litigation, as parties shop for jurisdictions whose laws are favorable in 
their particular cases.  Our solution responds to these problems:  adopting it would improve a 
particular jurisdiction’s laws, and adopting it everywhere would minimize the costs of diversity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix143 
 
 
 
Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
                                                                                                                                                                   
142 See note 16 infra. 
143 Where no official translations of primary sources have been available, translations from non-official entities have 
been used.  No amendments have been made to unclear or incorrect translations of primary sources.  
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USA Yes Yes (see,  
Solomon R. 
Guggenhei
m Found. 
v. Lubbell, 
569 N.E.2d 
426 (NY 
1991) 
Yes 
(UCC §2-
403(1)) 
Yes (UCC §2-
403(2)) 
Never 
adopted 
Varies 
depending 
upon 
jurisdiction; 
ranges from 
"demand and 
refusal" to 
"discovery" 
rule 
England Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act 1979 
§21) 
Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act 1979 
§21) 
Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act 1979 
§23) 
Yes (Factors 
Act 1889 
§2(1)) 
Repealed in 
1995 (1994  
amendments 
to Sale of 
Goods Act 
1979 §22) 
None (Factors 
Act 1889 §12) 
Italy Yes 
(Italian 
Civil 
Code Art. 
832) 
Yes, but 
the Code 
provides 
only for 
actions 
against the 
taker, not 
against the 
good faith 
purchaser 
(Italian 
Civil Code 
Arts. 834, 
1161) 
Yes 
(Italian 
Civil 
Code Art. 
1153) 
Yes (Italian 
Civil Code Art. 
1153) 
Yes (Italian 
Civil Code 
Arts. 1153 
and 1599) 
1 year from the 
discovery of 
the taking of 
the good, as 
against the 
taker (Italian 
Civil Code Art. 
1168); 10 
years for good 
faith purchaser 
before they're 
considered to 
have assumed 
ownership 
(Italian Civil 
Code Art. 
1161) 
Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
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German Yes (BGB 
§929) 
Yes, except 
when good 
faith 
purchaser 
acquired 
the good at 
an auction 
(BGB 
§935) 
Yes, so 
long as 
the buyer 
is in good 
faith and 
not 
grossly 
negligent
(BGB 
§§932, 
935) 
Yes (BGB 
§§932, 935) 
Yes, if the 
good faith 
purchaser 
acquired the 
good at an 
auction 
(BGB §935) 
None 
Switzer-
land 
Yes (§§ 
641, 715) 
Yes, but 
the owner 
must 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
(Swiss 
Civil Code 
§641, 934) 
Yes 
(Swiss 
Civil 
Code 
§717) 
Yes (Swiss 
Civil Code 
§717) 
Yes, unless 
owner 
reimburses 
the price 
paid by the 
good faith 
purchaser 
(Art. 934) 
5 years from 
when the good 
was lost or 
stolen (Swiss 
Civil Code 
§§722, 728, 
729, 934) 
France Yes 
(French 
Civil 
Code 
§711) 
Yes, but 
owner has 
to 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
(French 
Civil Code 
§§2276, 
2277, 
2280) 
Yes 
(French 
Civil 
Code 
§§2276, 
2277) 
Yes (French 
Civil Code 
§2277) 
Yes, good 
faith 
purchaser 
gets to keep 
goods 
unless 
owner 
compensate
s him 
(French 
Civil Code 
§2277, 
2280) 
3 years from 
when the good 
was lost or 
stolen (French 
Civil Code 
§2279) 
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Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
Spain Yes 
(Spanish 
Civil 
Code Art. 
348) 
Yes, but 
owner has 
to 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
if they 
bought it at 
a public 
sale 
(Spanish 
Civil Code 
Art. 464) 
No 
(Spanish 
Civil 
Code 
Arts. 436, 
447, 463, 
464) 
No (Spanish 
Civil Code 
Arts. 436, 447, 
463, 464) 
Yes, good 
faith 
purchaser 
gets to keep 
goods if he 
bought them 
at a sale, 
unless 
owner 
compensate
s him 
(Spanish 
Civil Code 
Art. 464) 
3 years 
(Spanish Civil 
Code. Arts. 
1955, 1962) 
Portugal Yes Yes (Portu-
guese Civil 
Code Art. 
892) 
No, but 
owner 
must 
compen-
sate good 
faith 
purchaser 
(Portugue
se Civil 
Code 
894) 
No, but owner 
has to 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
(Portuguese 
Civil Code Art. 
1301) 
No 
(Portuguese 
Civil Code 
Art. 892) 
4 years from 
original mis-
appropriation 
or theft 
(Portuguese 
Civil Code Art. 
1300) 
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Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
China Yes 
(Property 
Law of the 
People's 
Republic 
of China 
Art. 39) 
No, though 
the owner 
has the 
right to 
compensati
on from the 
person who 
transferred 
the goods 
to the good 
faith 
purchaser 
(Property 
Law of the 
People's 
Republic of 
China Art. 
106) 
Yes, but 
the owner 
can 
recover 
them 
after 
compen-
sating the 
good 
faith 
purchaser 
for the 
expenses 
necessary 
to 
maintain 
the goods 
(Property 
Law of 
the 
People's 
Republic 
of China 
Art. 241, 
243) 
Yes, but the 
owner can 
recover from 
the good faith 
purchaser as 
long as he 
compensates 
them for the 
good (Property 
Law of the 
People's 
Republic of 
China Art. 
107) 
Yes, good 
faith 
purchaser  
at an 
auction or 
from a 
qualified 
operator 
keeps goods 
unless the 
owner 
compensate
s the good 
faith 
purchaser 
for the price 
paid 
(Property 
Law of the 
People's 
Republic of 
China Art. 
107) 
2 years, 
beginning from 
when the 
owner knew or 
ought to have 
known the 
good was lost 
(Property Law 
of the People's 
Republic of 
China Art. 
107) 
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Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
Japan Yes 
(Japan 
Civil 
Code Arts. 
179, 206) 
Yes, but if 
good faith 
purchaser 
bought 
stolen good 
at an 
auction or 
at a public 
market or 
from a 
seller 
dealing in 
similar 
goods, 
owner must 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
for it (Art. 
194) 
Yes 
(Japan 
Civil 
Code 
Arts. 188, 
194, 204) 
Yes (Japan 
Civil Code 
Arts. 194, 204) 
Yes, unless 
owner 
compensate
s good faith 
purchaser 
for the good 
(Japan Civil 
Code Art. 
194)  
2 years from 
when the good 
was stolen or 
lost (Japan 
Civil Code Art. 
193) 
India Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act, 1930, 
§ 27) 
Yes (Sale 
of goods 
Act, 1930 § 
27) 
 Yes, 
mercantile 
agent in 
possession 
with owner’s 
consent can 
pass good title 
to good faith 
buyer (Sale of 
Goods Act, 
1930 § 27) 
No  
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Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes 
(Czech 
Civil 
Code 
§123) 
Yes (Czech 
Civil Code 
§126) 
Yes 
(Czech 
Civil 
Code 
§133(1)) 
Yes (Czech 
Civil Code 
§§612, 614(3)) 
No, the 
owner only 
has to 
compensate 
the good 
faith 
purchaser 
for the 
appreciation 
of the 
good's value 
from the 
time of loss 
to the time 
of the return 
within three 
years of the 
loss (Czech 
Civil Code 
§130) 
3 years from 
when the right 
was asserted to 
the good faith 
purchaser 
(Czech Civil 
Code §§102, 
134) 
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Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
Russia Yes (Civil 
Code of 
the 
Russian 
Federation 
Art. 209) 
Yes (Civil 
Code of the 
Russian 
Federation 
Art. 302(1) 
Yes 
(Civil 
Code of 
the 
Russian 
Federat-
ion Arts. 
218, 223, 
224) 
Yes (Civil 
Code of the 
Russian 
Federation 
Arts. 218, 223, 
224) 
No, owner 
can reclaim 
a good 
acquired  by 
good faith 
purchaser 
when the 
goods were 
either lost 
by the 
owner or the  
goods were 
stolen, or  
left the 
possession 
of  the 
owner 
contrary to 
their will  
(Art. 302) 
3 years from 
when the 
owner knew or 
should have 
known about 
the violation of 
his rights in the 
goods; but 
good faith 
purchaser gets 
ownership 
rights after 5 
years of 
uninterrupted 
possession of 
the goods 
(Civil Code of 
the Russian 
Federation 
Arts. 196, 200, 
234) 
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Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
Israel Yes (24 
Israel L. 
Rev. 82, 
97 (1990). 
Yes, as 
long as 
good faith 
purchaser 
acquired 
the good 
from one 
selling like 
merchan-
dise (Israeli 
Sales Law 
§ 34) 
Yes 
(Israeli 
Pledges 
Law §5) 
Yes (Israeli 
Sales Law § 
34) 
Yes, if 
goods are 
sold by 
merchant 
dealer in 
ordinary 
course of 
business, 
ownership 
passes to 
good faith 
buyer who 
takes 
possession 
(Sale Law 
(1968) § 
34). 
None 
Canada Quebec: 
Yes (Civil 
Code of 
Quebec 
Art. 947) 
Ontario: 
Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act § 22)  
Quebec: 
Yes (Civil 
Code of 
Quebec 
Art. 953, 
1713, 14) 
Ontario: 
Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act § 22 
Quebec: 
No (Civil 
Code of 
Quebec 
Arts. 
1713,14) 
Ontario:  
Yes (Sale 
of Goods 
Act § 24) 
Quebec:  No, 
but owner must 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
(Civil code of 
Quebec Art. 
1714) 
Ontario: 
Yes (Sale of 
Goods Act § 
23) 
Quebec: 
No, but 
owner must 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
“in the 
ordinary 
course of a 
business 
enterprise” 
(Civil Code 
of Quebec 
Arts. 953,    
1713-14) 
Ontario: No 
(Sale of 
Goods Act § 
23)  
Quebec: 3 
years (Civil 
Code of 
Quebec Art. 
2919) 
Country Adopts 
nemo dat 
as base 
principle? 
Theft 
rule? 
Voidable 
title? 
Entrustment? Market 
overt? 
Statute of 
limitations 
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Brazil Yes 
(Brazil 
Civil 
Code Arts. 
1197, 
1204, 
1228) 
Yes, but if 
the object 
is bought at 
a public 
auction, 
fair or 
market,  
the owner  
must pay 
the price 
paid by the 
buyer 
(Brazil 
Civil Code 
Art. 521) 
No 
(Brazil 
Civil 
Code 
Arts. 
1267, 
1268) 
No (Brazil 
Civil Code 
Arts. 1267, 
1268) 
Yes, if 
object  
bought at 
public 
auction, etc. 
the owner 
must 
compensate 
good faith 
buyer for 
his price; 
otherwise  
owner only 
has to 
compensate 
good faith 
purchaser 
for 
necessary 
and useful 
improvemen
ts to the 
good (Brazil 
Civil Code 
Art. 521, 
1219) 
3 years of 
possession by 
good faith 
purchaser 
gives title; 5 
years of 
possession by 
any third-
party, 
including thief, 
gives title 
(Brazil Civil 
Code Art. 
1261) 
Mexico Yes 
(Mexico 
Civil 
Code Arts. 
798, 830) 
Yes, unless 
the good 
faith 
purchaser 
acquired 
the goods 
at an 
auction 
(Mexico 
Civil Code 
Art. 799) 
No 
(Mexico 
Civil 
Code Art. 
798) 
Yes, but owner 
has right of 
action against 
seller (Mexico 
Civil Code Art. 
799) 
Yes, unless 
owner 
reimburses 
the good 
faith 
purchaser 
(Mexico 
Civil Code 
Art. 799) 
3 years 
(Mexico Civil 
Code Art. 
1153) 
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